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Case No. 20150187-CA 
INTHE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
INRE: 
DARRELL WAYNE MORRIS, 
Witness/Appellant 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
V. 
DANNY LEROY LOGUE, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellant appeals from an order finding him in contempt of court under 
Utah Code Ann. §78B-6-302 (West 2009), for refusing to testify in a trial 
involving a first degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code 
Ann. §78A-4-103(2)G) (West Supp. 2015) (pour over provision). 
In the conclusion of his brief, Morris asks this Court to dismiss a separate 
case in which he is charged with obstruction of justice. Br.Aplt.43. But this 
appeal is taken only from the order finding him in contempt of court, and 
entered in his co-defendant's case. R1543:2254-53. This Court therefore has no 
jurisdiction to consider the separate prosecution for obstruction of justice. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Morris-an eyewitness and accomplice to an aggravated murder-pled 
guilty to reduced charges for his role in that crime. The prosecution granted 
him use immunity and subpoenaed him to testify at his co-defendant's trial but 
he refused, claiming that (1) testifying could endanger him; and (2) his 
testimony was privileged under the Fifth Amendment because it could be used 
against him if he were charged with federal crimes associated with the murder. 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in finding that Morris's refusal 
to testify constituted contempt of court? 
Standard of Review. A trial court's finding of contempt is reviewed for 
abuse of discretion. See State v. Clark, 2005 UT 75, iJ18, 124 P.3d 235. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Addendum A contains: 
U.S. Const. amend. V; 
Utah Code Ann. §77-22b-1 (West Supp. 2015) (immunity); 
Utah Code Ann. §78B-6-301 (West 2009) (acts constituting contempt); 
Utah Code Ann. §78B-6-302 (West 2009) (contempt in immediate presence 
of court); 
Utah Code Ann. §78B-6-310 (West 2009) (punishment for contempt). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of facts. 
Murdering a "snitch" 
A drug dealer hired Appellant, Darrell Morris, to assault Andy Purcell 
because the dealer believed that Purcell had II snitched," i.e. informed police 
about the dealer's illegal activities. R1535:1243. 1 The dealer ,-vanted :tv1orris to 
inflict II serious bodily injury" on Purcell. R1535:1243. The dealer agreed to pay 
Morris one half-ounce of metha1nphetainine in advance and another half-ounce 
when he finished the job. R1535:1243. 
Morris recruited Danny Logue to help him assault Purcell. R1535:1243. 
When they left for Purcell's house, Morris had a baseball bat and Logue had a 
loaded gun. R1535:1243-42. 
Purcell was sitting on his front porch as the two approached. R1535:1242. 
Purcell shouted that he knew why they were coming and threatened to call 
1 Relevant documents are contained in the records of two separate but 
related cases: 111401535 (State v. Morris) and 111401543 (State v. Logue). The 
State differentiates between the two by first citing to the last four digits of the 
case number, and then the record page number-for example, R1535:1 
designates the first page of the record in State v. Morris. 
Morris eventually entered guilty pleas to reduced charges. R1535:1244-
36. Logue went to trial. R1543:1846. Because Morris refused to testify at 
Logue' s trial, the ruling finding Morris in contempt and the order imposing 
punishment were entered in Logue's case. R1543:2215-12 (Addendum B is a 
copy of the ruling and order). 
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police. R1535:1242. Logue responded by shooting Purcell. R1535:1242. Morris 
claimed to be surprised by the shooting and unaware that Logue had brought a 
gun. R1535:1242. 
Morris drove Logue to a spot where Logue hid the gun. R1535:1242. 
Morris then collected the other half-ounce of methamphetamine and shared it 
with Logue. R1535:1242. 
B. Summary of proceedings. 
The State charged Morris, Logue, and the drug dealer with aggravated 
murder and various other crimes. R1535:9-3. During plea negotiations, the 
State offered to agree not to call Morris as a witness at Logue' s trial if Morris 
would plead guilty to certain crimes. R1543:1294:9,12-13. Morris rejected that 
offer because he believed that the proposed crimes were too severe. 
R1543:1294:9,12-13; R1535:1285:7. The State then offered to allow Morris to 
plead to less-severe crimes but without a promise not to call him to testify. 
R1543:1294:9; R1535:7,14,23. 
Morris accepted that offer and pled guilty to one count each of 
manslaughter, obstruction of justice, and possession of a dangerous weapon by 
a restricted person. R1535:1243; R1535:1294:12-13. The plea agreement required 
the State to recommend that Morris's sentences run concurrently with each 
other, and with his sentence for forgery imposed in an umelated case. 
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R1535:1240. The plea agreement did not require the State to refrain from calling 
Morris as a witness at Logue's trial. R1535:1240; R1535:1285:7,14,23 
(Addendum C is a copy of the written plea statement). Morris was sentenced to 
imprisonment for one to fifteen years for both manslaughter and obstruction, 
and zero to five years for possession of a dangerous weapon. R1535:1247-45. 
The State subpoenaed Morris to testify at Logue's aggravated murder 
trial. R1543:2070. The prosecution also granted Morris use immunity under 
Utah Code Ann. §77-22b-1, even though he had already pied guilty to and been 
sentenced on various crimes arising from his role in the murder. R1543:211-18; 
R1543:1294:51. The immunity grant prevented the prosecution from using 
Morris's responsive testimony or II any information directly or indirectly 
derived from" that testimony II in any criminal or quasi-criminal case." 
R1543:2119-18. 
After receiving the subpoena, Morris wrote to the prosecutor stating that 
he would not testify. R1543:2051-52. Morris's only reason for refusing was that 
he believed his plea agreement prevented the prosecution from calling him as a 
witness. R1543:2051-52 (Addendum Eis a copy of Morris's letter). 
Morris's counsel als~ moved to quash the subpoena. R1543:2050-42 
(Addendum D is a copy of the motion). His counsel argued primarily that 
Morris had a Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify because he could be 
-5-
charged with federal crimes arising from the murder. R1543:2050-42. Morris's 
counsel also argued that, based on the plea agreement and the prosecutor's 
representations, Morris believed that he could be called as a witness only if 
Logue testified first and Morris's testimony was necessary for rebuttal. 
R1543:2047-42. Morris's counsel also generally asserted "that Morris is at risk of 
suffering substantial bodily harm or death if he gives testimony in a homicide 
case due to the dangerous circumstances of the prison environment." 
R1543:2043. 
The trial court denied Morris's motion to quash the subpoena. 
R1543:1294:12-20 (Addendum F is a copy of the oral argument and ruling on the 
motion to quash). The court found that the plea agreement did not prevent the 
prosecution from calling Morris as a witness and that Morris's fear of retaliation 
was "not a basis" to quash the subpoena. R1543:1294:12-13. The court also 
found that Morris could not refuse to testify based on the Fifth Amendment 
because he "ha[ d] no Fifth Amendment privilege to assert." R1543:1294:18. 
The court found that Morris had no Fifth Amendment privilege because 
he had already been convicted in state court for his role in the murder and the 
prosecution had granted him use immunity. R1543:~294:18-19. The trial court 
also found that the likelihood that the federal government would prosecute 
Morris was "fanciful and merely speculative," particularly in light of the federal 
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government's "Petite policy," which governs when the federal government will 
charge someone who has already been convicted in state court. R1543:1294:14-
15: 
Outside the presence of the jury, the trial court explained to Morris that 
he had no Fifth Amendment privilege to refuse to testify, that a subpoena was a 
court order to testify, and that if he refused to testify he could be held in 
contempt of court and could also be charged with obstruction of justice. 
R1543:1294:49. Morris nevertheless refused to testify. R1543:1294:50-54. 
Consequently, the trial court found him in contempt of court, sentenced him to 
thirty days in jail, to run consecutively to the prison terms he was currently 
serving, and fined him $1,000. R1543:2215-12 (Addendum B is a copy of the 
ruling and order on contempt); R1543:1294:54 (Addendum G is a copy of the 
transcript pages where Morris refused to testify and the trial court made an oral 
finding of contempt). 
Morris timely appeals the contempt finding. R1543:2254-53. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Morris argues that the trial court abused its discretion in finding him in 
contempt of court for refusing to testify because (1) he feared retaliation if he 
testified and (2) he had a Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify because his 
testimony could be used against him if he were charged with federal crimes 
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arising from the murder. The trial court acted well within its discretion in 
finding Morris in contempt. First, the trial court correctly concluded that 
Morris's claim of retaliation did not justify his refusal to testify because his 
claim was vague and unsubstantiated. 
The trial court also correctly concluded that Morris had no Fifth 
Amendment privilege because he had been granted immunity. If the federal 
government did decide to prosecute Morris for his involvement in this murder, 
it could not use his immunized testimony against him directly or even 
indirectly. The immunity grant therefore nullified any Fifth Amendment 
privilege Morris possessed based on any potential of federal prosecution. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WELL WITHIN ITS DISCRETION 
IN FINDING MORRIS IN CONTEMPT FOR REFUSING TO 
TESTIFY WHERE MORRIS ASSERTED ONLY A VAGUE AND 
UNSUBSTANTIATED CLAIM OF RETALIATION AND 
POSSESSED NO FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE 
Morris argues that the trial court erroneously found him in contempt for 
two reasons. First, he asserts that the trial court ignored his claim that he feared 
retaliation if he testified, and that this fear justified his refusal to testify. 
Br.Aplt.24-33. Second, he argues that his Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination justified his refusal to testify. Br.Aplt.24-43. The trial court 
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correctly rejected both arguments and therefore acted well within its discretion 
in finding Morris in contempt. 
A. The trial court considered and correctly rejected Morris's claim 
that fear of retaliation justified his refusal to testify. 
Morris argues that the trial court erred because it "failed to address" his 
claim that he faced a "substantial risk of bodily harm or death if he testified." 
Br.Aplt.24 (bolding and capitalization omitted). He also argues that this risk of 
retaliation outweighed any need for his testimony because the jury convicted 
Logue without his testimony. Br.Aplt.31-32. The trial court, however, expressly 
considered and correctly rejected Morris's claim that his fear of retaliation 
should excuse him from testifying. R1543:1294:12 (Add. F). This Court should 
not consider Morris's argument that his fear of retaliation outweighed any need 
for his testimony because Morris failed to preserve that argument and he argues 
no justification for that failure. Regardless, Logue' s conviction cannot excuse 
Morris's refusal to testify, especially a refusal based on an unsubstantiated fear 
of retaliation. 
1. Morris's vague and unsubstantiated claim of retaliation was 
insufficient to justify his refusal to testify. 
The trial court did not ignore Morris's claim that he feared retaliation. 
On the contrary, the trial court found that although Morris had alleged "that he 
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is fearful of retribution should he testify," that fear was "not a basis for a 
subpoena being quashed." R1543:1294:12-13 (Add. F). 
Had the trial court actually overlooked Morris's alleged fear of 
retaliation, it would be difficult to fault the trial court for doing so. Only two 
sentences of Morris's motion to quash addressed the issue. R1543:2043 (Add. 
D). And Morris's counsel did not raise this issue in his oral argument on the 
motion. R1543:1294:5-9 (Add. F). Rather, it was the prosecutor who raised the 
issue and argued that unsubstantiated fear was "not grounds to quash a 
subpoena." R1543:1294:9. 
The trial court correctly agreed with the prosecutor. It "has been widely 
held that a witness' fear of reprisal against himself or his family does not 
constitute just cause for refusing to testify." In re Grand Jury Proceeding (Doe), 13 
F.3d 459, 461 (1st Cir. 1994); see also LaTona v. United States, 449 F.2d 121, 122 (8th 
Cir. 1971) ("The concept of due process does not encompass the privilege of a 
witness not to testify because of fear of reprisals."); Dupuy v. United States, 518 
F.2d 1295, 1295 (9th Cir. 1975) ("No federal court in a reported decision has held 
that fear of retaliation is sufficient reason to refuse to testify."). 
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has recognized, albeit in dicta, 
that fear of retaliation is insufficient to justify a refusal to comply with an order 
to testify. See Piemonte v. United States, 367 U.S. 556, 559 n.2 (1961). Piemonte 
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was serving a federal prison sentence for heroin distribution when he refused to 
testify before a grand jury, despite being granted immunity. Id. at 557-58. He 
was found in contempt and sentenced to additional incarceration. Id. at 559. 
He appealed, claiming that the order requiring him to testify was not 
sufficiently clear and that his immunity grant was invalid. Id. at 559-61. He had 
also claimed that his testimony would endanger his life and the lives of his 
family, but he did not raise that argument as a basis for reversing his contempt 
sentence. Id. at 556-59. The Supreme Court nevertheless noted his alleged "fear 
for himself or his family," and observed that it would not "be a legal excuse" 
for refusing to testify. Id. at 559 n.2. The Supreme Court stated that if "two 
persons witness an offense- one being an innocent bystander and the other an 
accomplice who is thereafter imprisoned for his participation-the latter has no 
more right to keep silent than the former." Id. "[F]ear of reprisal offers an 
immunized prisoner no more dispensation from testifying than it does any 
innocent bystander without a record." Id. 
The Ninth Circuit explained why this is so. See In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings (Lahey), 914 F.2d 1372, 1375 (9th Cir. 1990). After observing that no 
federal court had held '"fear of retaliation is sufficient reason to refuse to 
testify,"' the Ninth Circuit explained that if it were "otherwise, any person 
involved with a criminal enterprise could point to the possible danger that 
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comes from giving testimony. The more vicious or sophisticated the enterprise, 
the greater the danger." Id. (quoting Dupuy v. United States, 518 F.2d 1295 (9th 
Cir. 1975)). Likewise, as the Seventh Circuit has observed, the "entire criminal 
justice process could be rendered inoperable if a witness with evidence 
concerning a crime could refuse to provide such evidence based on a few vague 
threats of reprisal." United States v. Patrick, 542 F.2d 381, 388 (7th Cir. 1976). 
The Seventh Circuit has recognized that although "fear, by itself, will not 
legally justify or excuse a witness' refusal to testify in violation of a court 
order," duress can be a defense to a contempt charge. See Patrick, 542 F .2d at 
388. But Morris failed to assert any reasonable basis to support a duress 
defense. 
The defense of duress- codified in Utah as "compulsion" - excuses what 
would otherwise be criminal conduct when the accused engages in the conduct 
"because he was coerced to do so by the use or threatened imminent use of 
unlawful physical force upon him or a third person, which force or threatened 
force a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would not have resisted." 
See Utah Code Ann. §76-2-302(1) (West 2015). The defense is therefore available 
only to one who is '"faced with a specific, imminent threat of death or serious 
bodily injury' to himself or a third person" and who "must have had 'no 
reasonable legal alternative to violating the law."' State v. Dozah, 2016 UT App 
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13, ,I17, 2016 WL 299071 (quoting State v. Ott, 763 P.2d 810, 812 (Utah App. 
1988)). 
Vague, unsubstantiated, or indefinite threats are insufficient to entitle a 
defendant to assert a compulsion defense, let alone to establish it. For example, 
a defendant who claimed that he was compelled to escape from the prison 
because other inmates had threatened his safety was not entitled to assert a 
compulsion defense where he produced only "general and vague" testimony 
about the alleged threats. See State v. Harding, 635 P.2d 33, 35 (Utah 1981). 
About a month before his escape, Harding claimed that other inmates had 
threatened him because he had helped an inmate whom those inmates had 
stabbed. Id. at 34. When asked about what he feared if he did not escape, 
Harding replied, "I really didn't know what was going to happen. It was you 
know situation [sic] where I just didn't know." Id. Because this testimony 
lacked "the specificity which is necessary to establish the existence of an 
immediate threat," it was insufficient to entitle Harding to assert a compulsion 
defense. See id. 
Cases addressing claims of compulsion or duress as a defense to a 
contempt finding likewise require proof of a specific, imminent threat of 
retaliation. For example, in In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Freligh), 894 F.2d 881, 
883 (7th Cir. 1989), the Seventh Circuit explained that while proof of "palpable 
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imminent danger" could be enough to entitle an alleged conternnor to the 
defense, "vague unsubstantiated fears" would be insufficient. Applying this 
test in Patrick, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's refusal to instruct 
on a duress in defense at a contempt hearing where Patrick presented no 
evidence "as to the immediacy of the danger to which he and his family were 
subjected or that he had no other opportunity to obey the court's order without 
subjecting himself to such danger." 542 F.2d at 388. Likewise, the Eleventh 
Circuit has held that to establish a defense of duress in a contempt proceeding, 
a defendant would have II to show that his refusal to testify before the grand 
jury was based on an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury, that he had 
a well-grounded fear that the threat would be carried out, and that there was no 
legal alternative to violating the law." United States v. Herre, 930 F.2d 836, 838 
(11th Cir. 1991) (citing United States v. Blanco, 754 F.2d 940,943 (11th Cir. 1985)). 
Although Morris claims that he "had a justifiable fear for his life," he cites 
nothing to substantiate that fear. Br.Aplt.28. Morris's letter to the prosecutor 
declaring his refusal to comply with the subpoena did not even mention fear of 
retaliation, let alone identify any specific, imminent threat that he would face if 
he testified. R1543:2052. Rather, he objected to the subpoena only because he 
believed that his plea agreement prevented the prosecution from calling him as 
a witness. R1543:2048,2052 (Add. E). 
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Two sentences of Morris's motion to quash did vaguely allege that he 
faced potential retaliation if he testified. R1543:2043 (Add. D). But neither 
provided any specific allegation of imminent danger. The first sentence stated 
that "other persons and witnesses" had "claimed" to have been threatened for 
their potential testimony. R1543:2043. But hearsay reports of unspecific threats 
to other witnesses could not justify Morris's refusal to testify. 
Morris also alleged that he was "at risk of suffering substantial bodily 
harm or death if he gives testimony in a homicide case due to the dangerous 
circumstances of the prison environment." R1543:2043. But this bald allegation 
identified no specific, imminent threat that Morris faced if he testified. 
In his brief, Morris does not cite to any testimony or other evidence that 
he provided the trial court that would substantiate his alleged fear of 
retaliation. Nor does he identify any specific, imminent threat he faced if he 
testified. Instead, he cites to testimony from Brandon Wright, one of the State's 
witnesses at Logue' s trial. Br.Aplt.28. Wright was a fellow inmate who 
belonged to the same prison gang as Morris and Logue, and to whom Logue 
allegedly confessed. R1543:2419:116-35. Morris also cites to a motion filed by 
Logue' s counsel seeking to exclude Wright's testimony as unreliable. 
Br.Aplt.28. But Morris's reliance on Wright is misplaced because even though 
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Wright was a fellow gang member and claimed that he would face retaliation 
for his testimony, he nevertheless testified at Logue's trial. R1543:2419:116-135. 
Logue' s counsel moved to exclude Wright's testimony as unreliable 
because Wright was allegedly bartering his testimony for favors from the 
prosecution. R1543:1513-1492. Wright had written to the prosecution allegedly 
asking that in exchange for his testimony, he be transferred to a different section 
of the prison and have an opportunity to ask the Board of Pardons to terminate 
his sentence because he would "be on gang hit lists" in Utah. R1543:1512-11. 
Logue' s counsel alleged that Wright had joined a prison gang during a previous 
incarceration but '"retired"' from the gang when he was paroled in 2006. 
R1543:1512. Wright allegedly wrote that, when he later returned to prison, he 
was told that he could not retire from the gang and that the gang had directed 
him to stab another inmate. R1543:1512-11. 
Despite his prison gang membership, Wright testified at Logue's trial. 
R1543:2419:116-135. He testified that Logue had confided to him that Logue 
and Morris had gone to the victim's house, that Logue had shot the victim, and 
that Logue had disposed of the murder weapon. R1543:2419:118-21. Wright 
also testified that he was in the same prison gang with Logue and Morris and 
that although he had previously disassociated himself from the gang, Logue 
told him that he could not "just drop out." R1543:2419:117-18,129. Wright 
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testified that gang members are obligated to help each other and that those who 
inform on other members are in danger of being assaulted and seriously 
injured. R1543:2419:121. He acknowledged that he was violating a rule of the 
gang by testifying. R1543:2419:121. Wright confirmed, however, that he was 
still in prison and had not received any benefit, or even a promised benefit, for 
his testimony, although he hoped that the Board of Pardons would consider 
terminating his sentence early so that he could leave Utah. R1543:2419:130,134. 
Wright's testimony undermines, rather than supports Morris's argument 
that the trial court should have quashed his subpoena. Wright testified at 
Logue' s trial despite his acknowledged fear that his former association with the 
gang put him at risk of retaliation in prison, and despite the lack of any 
promised benefit from the prosecution. Moreover, Wright's general testimony 
that gang members could face retaliation if they informed on other gang 
members did not identify any specific, imminent threat that Morris faced if he 
testified. Wright's testimony therefore supports the trial court's decision to 
deny the motion to quash. 
Morris argues that the government "'has an obligation to protect its 
citizens from harm."' Br.Aplt.30 (quoting Piemonte v. United States, 367 U.S. 556, 
559 n.2 (1961). He also claims that the trial court offered him "no protection at 
all." Br.Aplt.31. But Morris never asked for protection. Instead, he simply 
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refused to testify based on a vague and unsubstantiated claim of retaliation. 
And he never claimed- let alone demonstrated- that the prison would not be 
able to protect him from any specific threat. Indeed, Morris acknowledges that 
the Department of Corrections could have transferred him "to a County Jail 
facility in order to protect [him]." Br.Aplt.31. Had Morris shown that he faced 
a specific, imminent threat if he testified, then the trial court could have 
required the prosecution to show that it had taken reasonable steps to protect 
him from retaliation, or at least explain why it should not be required to take 
such steps, before finding him in contempt. But Morris never identified such a 
threat. The trial court therefore correctly found that Morris's alleged fear of 
retaliation was insufficient to justify his refusal to testify. 
2. This Court should not consider Morris's unpreserved claim 
that his fear of retaliation outweighed any need for his 
testimony because he argues no exception to the preservation 
rule; in any event, his argument is meritless. 
Morris also argues that the trial court should have quashed his subpoena 
because his fear of retaliation outweighed any need for his testimony where the 
jury convicted Logue without it. Br.Aplt.31-32. But Morris did not make this 
argument below. R1543:2050-42 (Add. D); R1543:1294:5-20 (Add. F). This Court 
should therefore decline to consider it because it is unpreserved and Morris 
does not argue any justification for appellate review. Br.Aplt.31-32. In any 
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event, the prosecution had a compelling reason for subpoenaing Morris because 
he had witnessed the murder. 
Generally, this Court will not consider issues on appeal that were not 
timely and specifically raised below. See State v. Isom, 2015 UT App 160, if 21, 
354 P.3d 791. An appellate court will address an unpreserved "issue only if (1) 
the appellant establishes that the district court committed 'plain error,' (2) 
'exceptional circumstances' exist, or (3) in some situations, if the appellant 
raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to preserve the 
issue."2 State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, ,I19, 192 P.3d 867. 
An appellant cannot adequately brief an unpreserved issue unless he 
presents his argument "through the lens of one ... of these exceptions." See 
State v. Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, if 21, 167 P.3d 1046; see also Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(5) (requiring an appellant, in his opening brief, to either demonstrate that 
the issue was preserved or state an exception for considering the unpreserved 
issue). Therefore, an appellate court will not consider unpreserved issues when 
the appellant articulates no justification for review. See Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, 
if 21; Isom, 2015 UT App 160, if 23. 
2 
'"[E]xceptional circu1nstances' is a concept that is used sparingly, 
properly reserved for truly exceptional situations" such as "rare procedural 
anomalies." State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 11 (Utah App. 1996) (quotation and 
citation omitted). No such circumstances exist here. 
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Morris does not argue that any justification for appellate review should 
apply to excuse his failure to raise this argument in the trial court. Br.Aplt.24-
33. This Court should therefore refuse to consider it. See Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, 
if 21; Isom, 2015 UT App 160, if 23. 
But even if this Court were to consider this argument, Morris could not 
establish that the trial court plainly erred for not sua sponte accepting it. Plain 
error occurs when the trial court commits obvious, prejudicial error. State v. 
Davis, 2013 UT App 228, il32, 364 P.3d 538 (citing State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 
1208 (Utah 1993)). An error cannot be obvious unless '"the law governing the 
error was clear at the time the alleged error was made."' Id. (quoting State v. 
Dean, 2004 UT 63, ,r16, 95 P.3d 276)). Morris cites to no controlling case stating 
that a subsequent conviction can purge a contempt finding for a witness who 
refuses to testify. Br.Aplt.31-33. Nor could the State find one. Moreover, it 
could not have been obvious to the trial court that Morris's fear of retaliation 
outweighed the need for his testimony where he never invited the trial court to 
weigh the need for his testimony against his alleged fear of retaliation, and 
especially where Logue had not yet been convicted. Therefore, Morris cannot 
show that the trial court plainly erred. 
Regardless, no error occurred here because Logue' s conviction was 
irrelevant to Morris's contempt citation for three reasons. First, a rule that a 
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conviction could purge a contempt finding for a witness who refuses to testify 
would severely undermine a court's essential authority to "compel obedience to 
its judgements, orders, and processes" and to "compel the attendance of 
persons to testify in a pending action or proceeding." See Utah Code Ann. 
§78A-2-201 (West 2009). Reluctant witnesses would feel greater freedom to 
flout court orders and subpoenas if a subsequent conviction in the case could 
purge their contempt. This would severely undermine a trial court's truth-
seeking function. 
Second, when Morris was called as a witness during Logue's trial, there 
was no way to know whether the jury would convict Logue without Morris's 
testimony. Thus, the trial court could not have relied on Logue's conviction as a 
basis for quashing the subpoena. 
Third, the prosecution had compelling reasons to believe that Morris's 
testimony was necessary to its case, even though it ultimately convicted Logue 
without it. Logue's defense was that he "was not present at [the victim's] house 
when [the victim] was shot that night," and that he was "not part of this. He 
didn't have anything to do with this." R1543:2412:46 (Logue's counsel's 
opening statement). Logue also asserted that the State's witnesses who agreed 
to testify were "very untrustworthy" because they were all "big time drug 
user[s]" who "lied to the police and later changed their stories." R1543:2412:46. 
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Logue himself testified that he did not shoot the victim and was not even 
present when the victim was shot. R1543:1295:67. His counsel argued in 
closing that the "best evidence is that [Logue] wasn't present." R1543:2423:97. 
Morris's testimony was necessary because he was both an eyewitness and 
an accomplice. His testimony would have not only refuted Logue' s claim that 
he was not present at the murder scene, it would have also established that 
Logue was the murderer. The fact that the jury ultimately convicted Logue 
despite Morris's refusal to testify did not diminish the prosecution's need for 
Morris's testimony. 
Morris argues that Brandon Wright could have given similar testimony. 
Br.Aplt.32. As mentioned, Logue did confess to Wright. R1543:2419:118-21. 
But Wright was, as Morris notes-" a jailhouse snitch" - Br.Aplt.32, and 
therefore subject to a credibility challenge. Moreover, unlike Morris, Wright 
was not present and did not witness Logue shoot the victim. Wright's 
testimony was therefore no substitute for Morris's eyewitness testimony. 
In sum, neither Morris's vague and unsubstantiated claim of retaliation, 
nor Logue' s subsequent conviction, justified Morris's refusal to testify. The trial 
court therefore did not abuse its discretion in refusing to quash his subpoena 
and ultimately finding him in contempt. 
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B. Morris had no Fifth Amendment privilege because the 
prosecution had granted him immunity. 
Morris argues that "the trial court erred in determining that [he] had no 
Fifth Amendment privilege to assert." Br.Aplt.33 (balding and capitalization 
omitted). He reasons that even though the state charges had been resolved, he 
continued to possess a Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 
because there remained a possibility that he could be charged with federal 
crimes arising from the murder, and that his testimony in Logue' s trial could be 
used against him in that potential federal prosecution. Br.Aplt.38-41. Morris 
observes that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prevent prosecution by a 
separate sovereign for crimes arising from the same facts. Br.Aplt.35-41. 
The trial court found that Morris had no Fifth Amendment privilege 
because: (1) he had already pled guilty for his involvement in the crime; (2) the 
prosecution had granted him use immunity; and (3) under the federal 
government's "Petite Policy," the likelihood that the federal government would 
prosecute him was "fanciful and merely speculative." R1543:1294:18. The trial 
court was correct. Morris could not claim a Fifth Amendment privilege 
because, even assuming that the federal government did charge him with 
crimes arising from the murder, the prosecution's grant of use immunity 
prevented the federal government from using any testimony compelled by that 
immunity grant. 
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Two provisions of the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution are 
relevant here. On provides that "No person ... shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const. amend. V. The other 
prevents a person from being "subject for the same offence to be twice put in 
jeopardy." Id. 
As Morris correctly observes, Br.Aplt.35, the Fifth Amendment protection 
against double jeopardy does not prevent separate sovereigns-for example a 
state and the federal government-from each prosecuting an individual for the 
same crime. United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922) ("It follows that an 
act denounced as a crime by both national and state sovereignties is an offense 
against the peace and dignity of both and may be punished by each."); see also 
Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88-89 (1985) (explaining dual-sovereignty 
doctrine). Thus, even though the State had already prosecuted Morris for his 
role in this murder, the federal government could also prosecute him for any 
federal crimes arising from his involvement. 
The prosecution's grant of immunity, however, nullified any Fifth 
Amendment privilege that arose from the possibility of a federal prosecution. 
When "a State compels an individual to testify through a grant of immunity, the 
federal government is prohibited from then using that testimony or its fruits 
against the witness in a federal prosecution." State v. Bond, 2015 UT 88, ,I26, 361 
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P.3d 104 (citing Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 79 
(1964) and United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 682 (1998)); see also State v. 
Delacruz, 364 P.3d 557 (Kan. App. 2015) ("[A] grant of immunity protects the 
witness from self-incrimination for any future state or federal prosecutions."). 
Because the immunity grant prevented the federal government from using 
Morris's testimony against him in any future federal prosecution, requiring his 
testimony at Logue's trial would not have compelled him to be a witness 
against himself. 
The Utah Supreme Court considered a similar issue in State v. Bond. 2015 
UT 88, ,J,I18-29. Bond and a co-defendant, Rettig, committed an aggravated 
murder. Id. ,I,I3-4. Rettig pled guilty to various crimes based on his 
involvement and the State subpoenaed him to testify at Bond's trial. Id. if 18. 
Rettig answered some preliminary questions, but was excused after he refused 
to testify further. Id. The next day, the prosecution recalled Rettig and granted 
him use immunity. Id. ,I19. Rettig objected and asserted his Fifth Amendment 
privilege, arguing that the immunity grant would not protect him from possible 
federal prosecution. Id. 
The trial court allowed the prosecutor to initially question Rettig outside 
the jury's presence. Id. Because Rettig was consistently answering, the court 
brought the jury in and allowed the questioning to continue. Id. Shortly 
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thereafter, however, Rettig invoked his Fifth-Amendment privilege in front of 
the jury and Bond moved for a mistrial on the grounds that the prosecution had 
committed misconduct by calling Rettig, knowing that he would invoke his 
Fifth Amendment privilege. Id. ,r,r20-21. The trial court denied the motion and 
Bond appealed. Id. ,r22. 
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed. Id. if 29. It held that although a 
prosecutor may not call a witness who he knows can claim a valid Fifth 
Amendment privilege "simply to 'impress[] upon the jury ... the claim of 
privilege,' id. ,r2s (quoting State v. White, 671 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1983)), ... a 
'prosecutor need not accept at face value every asserted claim of privilege,"' id. 
(quoting Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179, 789 (1963)). Thus, "a prosecutor 
does not commit misconduct if he has at least 'a colorable ... argument' that he is 
calling the witness for a proper purpose." Id. (quoting United States v. Torrez-
Ortega, 184 F.3d 1128, 1137 (10th Cir. 1999)). 
The Bond court recognized that the prosecutor there "had far more than a 
colorable argument that Mr. Rettig could not validly claim the privilege against 
self-incrimination because the prosecution granted him use immunity." Id. if 26. 
As explained, the Utah Supreme Court recognized in Bond that when "a State 
compels an individual to testify through a grant of immunity, the federal 
government is prohibited from then using that testimony or its fruits against the 
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witness in a federal prosecution." Id. The supreme court therefore concluded 
that "the immunity granted to Mr. Rettig by the State applied to both state and 
federal prosecutions, and the prosecutor's argument that Mr. Rettig could not 
validly claim the privilege was therefore not only colorable, but very likely 
correct." Id. 
Granted, the Bond court did not declare that the prosecutor was in fact 
correct that the immunity grant nullified Rettig' s claim of privilege. It did not 
do so presumably because it did not have to decide that issue. The issue in 
Bond was whether the prosecutor had '" a colorable'" argument that Rettig did 
not have a valid Fifth Amendment privilege. Id. '1!25 ( quoting Torez-Ortega, 184 
F.3d at 1137). Because it was clear that Bond's prosecutor did, the supreme 
court did not have to decide whether Rettig' s immunity grant actually nullified 
his Fifth Amendment privilege. 
Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court authority on which Bond 
relied makes clear that a state prosecutor's immunity grant does nullify the 
Fifth Amendment privilege. Id. at iJ29 (quoting Murphy, 378 U.S. at 79). The 
United States Supreme Court first addressed the potential federal use of state-
immunized testimony in Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958), overruled in 
part by Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964). 
A New York grand jury granted Schweitzer immunity to compel his testimony 
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about alleged racketeering activities. Id. at 372. Schweitzer nevertheless 
refused to testify, claiming a fear of federal prosecution. Id. at 373-74. Citing a 
hesitance to interfere with state enforcement of state laws, the Supreme Court 
held that the Fifth Amendment did not apply to the States, and that Schweitzer 
thus did not have a valid claim of privilege. Id. at 379-80. 
Six years later, the Supreme Court extended the Fifth Amendment's 
privilege against self-incrimination to the States. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 
(1964). That same day, the Court re-addressed Schweitzer in Murphy v. 
Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964), abrogated in part by 
United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666 (1998). Murphy was subpoenaed to testify 
before the Waterfront Commission about a work stoppage in New Jersey. Id. at 
53. Though both New York and New Jersey granted him immunity from 
prosecution, he still refused to testify because he claimed that he feared federal 
prosecution. Id. at 53-54. The Supreme Court held that while the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination did apply to the States, the 
state immunity grants nullified any claim of privilege. Id. at 79. To honor the 
privilege against self-incrimination while still ensuring the states' ability to 
obtain information necessary to enforce state laws, the Murphy court created a 
federal exclusionary rule: if a state witness testifies under a state grant of 
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immunity, "the Federal Government may make no ... use of the answers" 
should it elect to prosecute. Id. at 80. 
The Court most recently addressed Murphy in United States v. Balsys, 524 
U.S. 666 (1998). Balsys-a suspected Nazi war criminal-was brought to testify 
before a Department of Justice investigatory panel. Id. at 669. He asserted his 
Fifth Amendment privilege on the ground that he feared prosecution by a 
foreign country. Id. The Court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege did not 
extend that far. Id. at 698. 
In rejecting Balsys' s claim, the Court re-examined Murphy, explaining 
that its holding carried "two alternative rationales": one which established the 
rule for domestic prosecutions, and one that left open the possibility of its 
application to foreign prosecutions. Id. at 680-81, 684. The first, more 
"traditional" rationale, was supported by "the principle that the courts of a 
government from which a witness may reasonably fear prosecution may not in 
fairness compel the witness" to incriminate himself. Id. at 683, 684. Although 
the executive branch of state or federal government can "exchange" the Fifth 
Amendment privilege "for an immunity to prosecutorial use of any compelled 
inculpatory testimony," that immunity must be "as broad as the privilege 
itself." Id. at 682 (citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 448-49 (1972)). 
Otherwise, a "witness could be 'whipsawed into incriminating himself under 
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both state and federal law."' Id. at 681 (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 55 
(1964)). The Murphy court therefore created a federal exclusionary rule for 
state-immunized testimony because the Fifth Amendment privilege applied to 
the states, but state immunity statutes could not bind the federal government. 
Id. at 682-83. Thus, the Balsys court explained that "[a]fter Murphy, the 
immunity option open to the Executive Branch could be exercised only on the 
understanding that the state and federal jurisdictions were as one, with a 
federally mandated exclusionary rule filling the space between the limits of 
state immunity statutes and the scope of the privilege." Id. at 683. 
The Balsys Court held that this rationale in Murphy was not only "sound," 
id. at 683-84, but "undoubtedly correct," id. at 680. But to the extent that 
Murphy's broader rationale could be read to extend the privilege to include 
foreign prosecutions, the Balsys Court rejected it. Id. at 688. 
Murphy therefore establishes, and Balsys confirms, that a state immunity 
grant nullifies a claim of Fifth Amendment privilege based on the possibility of 
federal prosecution. See Murphy, 378 U.S. at 79; Balsys, 524 U.S. at 680-83. Thus, 
the prosecutor in Bond was not merely "very likely correct" that Rettig-the 
immunized witness there-had no valid Fifth Amendment privilege based on 
an alleged fear of federal prosecution. See 2015 UT 88, iJ27. In fact, the 
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prosecutor was correct that the immunity grant nullified Rettig' s Fifth 
Amendment privilege. See Murphy, 378 U.S. at 79; Balsys, 524 U.S. at 680-83. 
Likewise, the prosecution's grant of immunity to Morris in this case 
nullified any Fifth Amendment privilege he possessed based on any potential 
federal prosecution. See id. The trial court therefore correctly concluded that he 
had no Fifth Amendment privilege and acted well within its discretion in 
finding Morris in contempt for refusing to testify. R1543:1294:18,48-55. 
Morris asserts that the trial court's reliance on the Department of Justice's 
"Petite Policy" was insufficient to find that he lacked a Fifth Amendment 
privilege. Br.Aplt.41-42. The "Petite Policy" generally prohibits "a federal 
prosecution following a state prosecution except when necessary to advance 
compelling interests of federal law enforcement." Rinaldi v. United States, 434 
U.S. 22, 28 (1977). But even if Morris is correct that this policy did not itself 
justify a finding that he had no Fifth Amendment privilege, the grant of use 
immunity did nullify the privilege. See Bond, 2015 UT 88, 1126-27; Murphy, 378 
U.S. at 79; Balsys, 524 U.S. at 680-83. The trial court therefore correctly found 
that Morris possessed no Fifth Amendment privilege, even if it incorrectly 
relied on the Petite Policy as an alternative rationale for its conclusion. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
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U.S. Const. amend. V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, 
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in 
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or 
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice 
put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-22b-1 (West Supp. 2015). Immunity granted to witness 
(l)(a) A witness who refuses, or is likely to refuse, on the basis of the witness's 
privilege against self-incrimination to testify or provide evidence or information 
in a criminal investigation, including a grand jury investigation or prosecution of 
a criminal case, or in aid of an investigation or inquiry being conducted by a 
goverrnnent agency or commission, or by either house of the Legislature, a joint 
committee of the two houses, or a committee or subcommittee of either house, 
may be compelled to testify or provide evidence or information by any of the 
following, after being granted use immunity with regards to the compelled 
testimony or production of evidence or information: 
(i) the attorney general or any assistant attorney general authorized by the 
attorney general; 
(ii) a dish·ict attorney or any deputy district attorney authorized by a 
district attorney; 
(iii) in a county not within a prosecution district, a county attorney or any 
deputy county attorney authorized by a county attorney; 
(iv) a special counsel for the grand jury; 
(v) a prosecutor pro tempore appointed under the Utah Constitution, 
Article VIII, Sec. 16; or 
(vi) legislative general counsel in the case of testimony pursuant to 
subpoena before: 
(A) the Legislature; 
(B) either house of the Legislature; or 
(C) a committee of the Legislature, including a joint committee, a 
committee of either house, a subcommittee, or a special investigative 
committee. 
(b) If any prosecutor authorized under Subsection (l)(a) intends to compel a 
witness to testify or provide evidence or information under a grant of use 
immunity, the prosecutor shall notify the witness by written notice. The 
notice shall include the information contained in Subsection (2) and advise the 
witness that the witness may not refuse to testify or provide evidence or 
information on the basis of the witness's privilege against self-incrimination. 
The notice need not be in writing when the grant of use immunity occurs on 
the record in the course of a preliminary hearing, grand jury proceeding, or 
trial. 
(2) Testimony, evidence, or Ltformntion compelled under Subsection (1) may 
not be used against the witness in any criminal or quasi-criminal case, nor any 
information directly or indirectly derived from this testimony, evidence, or 
information, unless the testimony, evidence, or information is volunteered by the 
witness or is otherwise not responsive to a question. Immunity does not extend 
to prosecution or punishment for perjury or to giving a false statement in 
connection with any testimony. 
(3) If a witness is granted immunity under Subsection (1) and is later 
prosecuted for an offense that was part of the h·ansaction or events about which 
the witness was compelled to testify or produce evidence or information under a 
grant of immunity, the burden is on the prosecution to show by a preponderance 
of the evidence that no use or derivative use was made of the compelled 
testimony, evidence, or information in the subsequent case against the witness, 
and to show that any proffered evidence was derived from sources totally 
independent of the compelled testimony, evidence, or information. The remedy 
for not establishing that any proffered evidence was derived from sources totally 
independent of the compelled testimony, evidence, or information is suppression 
of that evidence only. 
(4) Nothing in this section prohibits or limits prosecutorial authority granted 
in Section 77-22-4.5. 
(5) A county attorney within a prosecution district shall have the authority to 
grant immunity only as provided in Subsection 17-18a-402(3). 
(6) For purposes of this section, "quasi-criminal" means only those 
proceedings that are determined by a court to be so far criminal in their nature 
that a defendant has a constitutional right against self-incrimination. 
Credits 
Laws 1997, c. 296, § 19, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 2013, c. 237, § 43, eff. May 14, 2013; 
Laws 2013, 1st Sp. Sess., c. 1, § 6, eff. July 19, 2013. 
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Utah Code Ann. §78B-6-301 (West 2009). Acts and omissions constituting 
contempt 
The following acts or omissions in respect to a court or its proceedings are 
contempts of the authority of the court: 
(1) disorderly, contemptuous, or insolent behavior toward the judge while 
holding the court, tending to interrupt the course of a trial or other judicial 
proceeding; 
(2) breach of the peace, boisterous conduct or violent disturbance, tending to 
interrupt the due course of a trial or other judicial proceeding; 
(3) misbehavior in office, or other willful neglect or violation of duty by an 
attorney, counsel, clerk, sheriff, or other person appointed or elected to 
perform a judicial or ministerial service; 
(4) deceit, or abuse of the process or proceedings of the court, by a party to an 
action or special proceeding; 
(5) disobedience of any lawful judgment, order or process of the court; 
(6) acting as an officer, attorney or counselor, of a court without authority; 
(7) rescuing any person or property that is in the custody of an officer by 
virtue of an order or process of the court; 
(8) unlawfully detaining a witness or party to an action while going to, 
remaining at, or returning from, the court where the action is on the 
calendar for trial; 
(9) any other unlawful interference with the process or proceedings of a court; 
(10) disobedience of a subpoena duly served, or refusing to be sworn or to 
answer as a witness; 
(11) when summoned as a juror in a court, neglecting to attend or serve, or 
hnproperly conversing with a party to an action to be tried at the court, or 
with any other person, concerning the merits of an action, or receiving a 
communication from a party or other person in respect to it, without 
immediately disclosing the communication to the court; and 
(12) disobedience by an inferior tribunal, magistrate or officer of the lawful 
judgment, order or process of a superior court, or proceeding in an action 
or special proceeding contrary to law, after the action or special 
proceeding is removed from the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal, 
magistrate or officer. Disobedience of the lawful orders or process of a 
judicial officer is also a contempt of the authority of the officer. 
Credits 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 914, eff. Feb. 7, 2008. 
Utah Code Ann. §78B-6-302 (West 2009). Contempt in immediate presence of 
court-Summary action-Outside presence of court-procedure 
(1) When a contempt is committed in the immediate view and presence of the 
court, or judge at chambers, it may be punished summarily. An order shall be 
made, reciting the facts occurring in the immediate view and presence of the 
court. The order shall state that the person proceeded against is guilty of a 
contempt and shall be punished as prescribed in Section 78B-6-310. 
(2) When the contempt is not committed in the immediate view and presence of 
the court or judge, an affidavit or statement of the facts by a judicial officer 
shall be presented to the court or judge of the facts constituting the contempt. 
Credits 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 915, eff. Feb. 7, 2008. 
Utah Code Ann. §78B-6-310 (West 2009). Contempt-Action by court 
The court shall determine whether the person proceeded against is guilty of 
the contempt charged. If the court finds the person is guilty of the contempt, the 
court may impose a fine not exceeding $1,000, order the person incarcerated in 
the county jail not exceeding 30 days, or both. However, a justice court judge or 
court commissioner may punish for contempt by a ~ine not to exceed $500 or by 
incarceration for five days or both. 
Credits 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 923, eff. Feb. 7, 2008. 
Addendum B 
FIL~D 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, FEB 1 2 2015 
UTAFI COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH ·HH DISTrHCT ST>.Yl? OF UTAH 
IJTA!-i COUtHY 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
\'. 
D1\NNY LEROY LOGUE. 
De f'cndant, 
in regard to DARRELL WAYNE MORRIS, 
Witness. 
RULING AND ORDER-
CONTEMPT OF COURT RE: DARRELL 
\VA YNE MORRIS 
Case No. 111401543 
JUDGE DEREK P. PULLAN 
This matter comes before the court during the jury trial in the above captioned case. On 
Janunry 30, 2015~ day seven of lhat jury trial, the State called Darrell Wayne Morris to testify. 
~ lvlr. \forris was under subpoena and represented by Gregory Stewart and Neil Skousen. Before 
laking the witness stand and outside the presence of the jury, the State offered Mr. Morris use 
immunity for his testimony. Mr. Morris discussed this with his counsel, but refused to testify in 
this case. i\11r. N1orris was then brought in by the Department of Corrections and seated in the 
witness stand. After taking the witness stand in the presence of the jury and being directed by the 
~ Court to lcslify in this case, rvlr. l\forris refused to answer any questions. 
Outside the presence of the jury, the Court found that with that grant of immunity ivlr. 
,\t!orris lwd no 5th Amend1rn.:nl privilege not to testify, and thal if he refused to testify he would 
b<.: held in contempt of court and punished as prescribed in § 7813-6-310, and could be subject lo 
prosecution for obstruction of justice and pc1jury. Mr. Morris indicated that it was still his 
intL:ntion not to testify. The Court found I\1fr. i\•Iorris in direct contempt of court. Pursuant to § 
- · 002215 
7813-6-310~ the Court ordered ivlr. iv1orris to pny n SI 000 fine and to serve 30 days in the county 
jail. to nrn consecutively to tht: timt! h~ is <.:urremly serving in prison. 
Consistent wilh the Court 1 s verbal ruling, and pursuant to § 78B-6-302, the Court hereby 
FINDS and ORDERS: 
o Darrell Wayne l\forris is guilty of contempt in the immediate view and presence 
of the Court; 
o Pursuant to§ 7SB-6-310. i\·lr. i\forris is ordered to pay a $1000 fine and serve 30 
days in the county jail, consecutive to the time he is currently serving in prison. 
DATED this /;J clay of February, 2015. 
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IN TI-IE FOURTI-I JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UT All 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plain ti ft~ 
\'. 
DANNY LEROY LOGUE, 
Defendant, 
in regard to DARRELL WAYNE iVlORRIS, 
Witness. 
WARRANT IN AID OF 
COMMITTMENT 
Ca~e No. l 1140i543 
JUDGE DEREK P. PULLAN 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE STATE OF UTAH: 
On January 30~ 2015, Darrell Wayne i\forris was found in direct contempt of court under 
Utah Cod~§ 788-6-302. (See Ruling and Order- Contempt of Court Re: Darrell Wayne Morris, 
Case No. I 11401543, Feb. 12, 2015). 
NOW THEREFORE, YOU ARE CO1vHvtANDED to arrest DARRELL WAYNE 
:\·lORRIS upon his release from the Utah Stmc Prison to serve 30 days in the Utah County Jail 
for Contempt or Court. 
DATED this_/;?-, day of February, 2015. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
DANNY LEROY LOGUE: 
Defendant, 
in regard to DARRELL WAYNE Iv1ORRIS, 
Witness. 
ORDER OF COMMITMENT 
Case No. 111401543 
JUDGE DEREK P. PULLAN 
Darrell Wayne Morris \Vas found guilty of direct contempt of court under Utah Code § 
788-6-302 on January 30, 2015. (See Ruling and Order- Contempt of Court Re: Darrell \Vayne 
Ivlorris, Case No. l 11401543, Feb. l 2~ 2015). 
Pursuant to Utah Code § 788-6-310, Mr. orris is ordered to pay a $1000 fine and serve 30 
days in the Utah County Jail upon his release from the Utah State Prison. 
DATED this ll - day of February, 2015. 
BY THE COURT: 
002212 
CERTIFICA'fE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify chat a copy of the attached document was sent to the following 















CURTIS L LARSON curtisl@utahcounty.gov 
RYAN B MCBRIDE ryanm~utahcounty.gov 
NEIL SKOUSEN Ndskousen@aol.com 
GREGORY V STEWART greg.stewart@usa.net 
UTAH STATE PRISON marialister@utah.gov 
02/13/2015 /s/ MYKSL DALLEY 
Deputy Court Clerk 




'JUL 1 5 2014-
4TH DISTR:t'{\ STATE OF UT 
PJAH cov1, 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




STATE1\1ENT OF DEFENDANT 
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA 
AND CERTIFICATE OF CO!JNSEL 
Case No. 111401535 
I, DARRELL MORRIS, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been advised of 
and that I understand the following facts and rights: 
Notification of Charges 
I am pleading guilty ( or no contest) to the following crimes: 




B. OBSTRUCTION OF rusTICE 
U.C.A. 76-8-306 
C. P O S S E S S I O N O F A 










1-15 Year in the Utah State 
Prison; $10,000.00 Fine 
plus a 90% surcharge and a 
$33.00 security fee 
1-15 Year in the Utah State 
Prison; $10,000.00 Fine 
plus a 90% surcharge and a 
$33.00 security fee 
0-5 Years in the Utah State 
Prison; $5.000.00 :fine olus 
a 90% surcharge and $33.00 
security fee. 
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I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or 
had it read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am 
pleading guilty (or no contest). 
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) are: 
r,ATThT"'r ,. l.KA1'.TC'T ATT/'"!U'l'"'nD. ("\,..,, "" .. ... i....-..nt c:.11,:..12n11 1·n Ut'.ll, f""1n11nty Ut-:1h T rHA \..,VU.I. 'I .I. .1. J.VJ.n..L 'llo..JJ..ll""l.UU.J.J. .J. UJ.'\.o VU VJ. UUVU .JI J.V/ u J. J., 1..u .. 1..1 . .._,.V\,U , \.u.i.a., .i. ~ ... ~ 
recklessly cause the death of another. 
COUNT 2: OBSTRUCTION OF WSTICE: On or about 5/16/2011, in Utah County, Utah, 
I did, with intent to hinder, delay, or prevent the investigation, apprehension, prosecution, 
conviction, or punishment of any person regarding conduct that constituted a criminal 
offense, to wit: aggravated murder, a first-degree felony, alter, destroy, conceal an item or 
other thing. 
COUNT 3: POSSESSION OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON BY A RESTRICTED 
PERSON: On or about 5/16/2011, in Utah County Utah, I did intentionally or knowingly 
have under my custody or control, possess or use a dangerous weapon and I was a category 
I restricted person because I had been convicted of a violent felony as defined in Utah Code 
§ 76-3-203.5. 
I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes 
listed above. I stipulate and agree that the following facts describe my condu~t and the 
conduct of other persons for which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for 
the court to accept my guilty pleas and prove the elements of the crimes to which I am 
pleading guilty: 
Prior to May 15, 2011, I was introduced to Yuri Lara by Billy Thompson. Yuri Lara told 
me Andy Purcell had snitched on him to police and asked me if I would beat Andy 
Purcell to keep him from testifying. Yuri Lara wanted me to beat Andy Purcell, to 
commit serious bodily injury upon him. Yuri Lara offered to pay me one ounce of 
methamphetamine; half paid in advance and half paid afterwards. I agreed. Yuri Lara 
showed me where Andy Purcell lived. He drove his car and I drove with Brittany Bishop. 
Yuri Lara indicated which house Andy Purcell lived in as we drove by. 
I asked Danny Logue to help with the beating of Andy Purcell. I told him Andy Purcell 
had snitched on someone and they wanted him beaten up. In the early morning hours of 
May 16, 2011) Danny Logue and I left Robin Jackson and Brittany Bishop at Robin's 
1 
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residence in Orem, Utah, and drove to Andy Purcell's home. I took a baseball bat and, 
unbeknownst to me, Danny Logue took a gun. I am a restricted person due to having been 
convicted of aggravated assault, a third-degree felony. I drove. We left the car near Andy 
Purcell's home and walked the rest of the way to his home. Andy Purcell was outside the 
home on the front porch. Andy Purcell began yelling at us that he lmew why we were 
there and threatened to call the police. We were about 25 feet from the front porch when 
to my swprise Danny Logue took out the gun and shot three or four rounds at Andy 
Purcell. When Andy Purcell fell to the ground we ran. 
Danny Logue and I then drove away from the scene. I drove to a location where Danny 
Logue hid the gun; I was aware he was hiding it and drove him to and from the location. 
Later that morning I contacted Yuri Lara requesting the second payment. He paid me the 
second half ounce of methamphetamine at the Home Depot in the East Bay area of Provo, 
Utah, in the evening hours of May 18, 2011. I later shared the methamphetamine with 
Danny Logue. 
Waiver of Constitutional Rights 
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights 
under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead 
guilty (or no contest) I will give up all the following rights: 
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I 
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I 
understand that I might later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay 
for the appointed lawyer's service to me. 
I have not waived my right to counsel. 
If I have waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and 
that I understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am 
pleading guilty (or no contest). I also understand my rights in this case and other cases 
and the consequences of my guilty (or no contest) plea(s). 
My attorneys are Greg Stewart and Neil Skousen. My attorneys and I have fully 
discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of my guilty pleas. 
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial 
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty. 
Confrontation and cross .. examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to 
have a trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified 
2 
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against me and b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have 
ihe opportunity to cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me. 
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a trial, I could call 
witnesses if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance 
and testimony of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, 
the State would pay those costs. 
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were 
to have a trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I 
Chone ........ + +,... +c.,,..;~y .... " ,.,. .... .a nn•'lld molr.o 'W'VIA t.oc-f;-,;, l"\'t" ml'.llrA m.i:. ,,.;U&llo P.UtrlP.nrP. ag~;nct 
.l. .:, llVL LV L .:,u1 , u.v vu..., \,,VU .u.an.v .1..1 . .1.v """"ui)' v.a. .a..u.u.a. .... "" .1..1..1.v 1:,.1.""" v" .&.~'-'&.&'-'"" ~.&v" 
myself. I also know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could 
not hold my refusal to testify against me. 
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead 
guilty, I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged 
crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty," and 
my case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each 
element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the 
verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty. 
I understand that if I plead guilty, I give up the presumption of innocence and will 
be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above. 
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or 
judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford 
the costs of an appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am 
giving up my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty. I understand that if I wish to 
appeal my sentence I must file a notice of appeal within 30 days after my sentence is 
entered. 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up 
an the statutory and constitutional rights as explained aboveo 
Consequences of Entering a Guilty Plea 
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each 
crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no 
contest) to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving 
a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, 
or both. 
I know that in addition to a fine, a ninety percent (90%) surcharge will be 
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imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my 
crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part 
of a plea agreement. 
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one 
crime involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they 
may run at the same ti.me (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine 
for each crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting 
sentencing on another offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead 
guilty (or no contest), my guilty (or no contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive 
sentences being imposed on me. If the offense to which I an1 now pleading guilty 
occurred when I was imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to 
impose consecutive sentences unless the court finds and states on the record that 
consecutive sentences would be inappropriate. 
Plea agreement. My guilty pleas are the result of a plea agreement between 
myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and provisions of the plea 
agreement, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those explained below: 
The State makes the following agreements: 
A. To amend the original charges, to wit: aggravated murder, a first degree 
felony; Possession of a firearm by a restricted person, a second degree 
felony; obstructing justice, a second degree felony, to the offenses listed 
herein, to wit: manslaughter, a second degree felony; obstruction of justice, 
a second degree felony; and possession of a dangerous weapon by a 
restricted person, a third degree felony; and 
B. The State agrees to recommend the sentences for each offense to run 
concurrently with each other. 
C. The State agrees to recommend that the current case run concurrently with 
the sentence for defendant's forgery conviction in Utah case number 
111903267 from June 2011. 
In exchange for the State's agreement, I agree to the following: 
A. To plead guilty to the amended charges; 
B. To be sentenced to prison; and 
C. That I will not receive credit for time served. 
Trial judge not boundct I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges 
for sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are 
not binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what 
they believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge. However, this agreement is 
being entered into pursuant to Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. A 
4 
tentative plea agreement has been reached and the judge, upon request of the parties, was 
notified in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge indicated to the 
prosecuting attorney(s) and defense counsel that he would approve the proposed 
disposition. If the judge decides that final disposition should not be in confonnity with the 
plea agreement, the judge shall advise the Defendant and then call upon the Defendant to 
either affirm or withdraw the plea. 
Immigration/Deportation: I understand that if I am not a United States citizen, 
my plea(s) today may, or even will, subject me to deportation under United States 
immigration laws and regulations, or otherwise adversely affect my immigration status, 
which ir...ay include perrn<!nently ba.-rr'..ng my re-entry L11to the United States. I understa..11d 
that if I have questions about the effect of my plea on my immigration status, I should 
consult with an immigration attorney. 
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, of 
unlawful influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). 
No promises except those contained in this statement have been made to me. 
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I 
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free 
to change or delete anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any 
changes because all of the statements are correct. 
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
I am 'if years of age. I have attended school through the / l ~ grade. I can 
read and understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter 
has been provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or 
intoxicants which would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not 
presently under the influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my 
judgment. 
I believe myse1f to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of 
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any 
mental disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I 
am doing or from lmowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea. 
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty plea(s), I must file ·a 
written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before sentence is announced. If I waive 
time fm• sentencing and am sentenced at the time I enter my pleas I understand that 
I am waiving my right to withdl"aw my plea. I will only be allowed to withdraw my 
5 
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pleas if I show that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. I understand that 
any challenge to my pleas made after sentencing must be pursued under the Post-
@ Conviction Remedies Act in Title 78, Chapter 3Sa, and Rule 6SC of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
Dated this .f.2:~ay of ___ l}t...,....,......~----_,• 21-rf-. 
6 
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Certificate of Defense Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for DARRELL MORRIS, the defendant above, and 
that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; I have 
discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its 
contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and 
belief, after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual 
synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with 
the other representations and declarations made by the def end ant in the foregoing 
affidavit) are accurate and true. 
Bar No. /oD'2if 
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Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney 
@ I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against DARRELL 
MORRIS, defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant and find that the 
factual basis of the defendanfs criminal conduct which constitutes the offense(s) is true 
and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage a plea has been 
offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained in the Statement and in the 
@ attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before the Court. There is 
reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the conviction of defendant 
for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the acceptance of the 
plea(s) would serve t..lie public interest. 
PROSECUTING A 





Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the 
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court 
witnesses the signatures and finds that defendant's guilty pleas are freely, knowingly, and 
voluntarily made. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty pleas to the crimes set 
forth in the Statement be accepted and entered. 





NEIL SKOUSEN (10064) 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1771 
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Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 971 
Orem, UT 84059-0971 
Tel: 801-709-0234 
Fax: 801-852-13 75 
Email: greg .. stewart@usa.net 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Darrell Wayne Morris 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
DANNY LEROY LOGUE, 
DOB: 12-23-1965 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO QUASH 
WITNESS SUBPOENA FOR 
DARRELL WAYNE MORRIS 
Case No. 111401543 
Judge Derek Pullan 
COMES NOW, Darrell Wayne Morris ("Morris"), by and through his public 
defender attorneys Neil Skousen and Gregory Stewaii, and respectfully moves this Court, 
~ pursuant to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination under the United 
~ 002050 
States Constitution, Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Rule 45 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to quash the witness subpoena for Darrell Wayne Morris 
to testify in this matter, based upon the following assertions and argument. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Darrell Wayne Morris was charged as a co-defendant in Fourth District Court 
Case No. 111401535. On or about April 3, 2012, Neil Skousen and Greg Stewa11 entered 
their appearance as conflict legal counsel for Mr. Morris and have continued to represent 
Mr. Morris as his legal counsel through all related criminal matters, including the cun-ent 
jury trial of co-defendant, Danny Leroy Logue. 
On or about July 15, 2014, Mr. Morris pied guilty to state charges of: ( 1) 
manslaughter, a second degree felony, (2) possession of a dangerous weapon by a 
restricted person, a third degree felony, and (3) obstructing justice, a second degree 
felony. As part of the parties' plea agreement, the Court dismissed the remaining state 
charges of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance x 2 counts, a first 
degree felony, and knowingly being present when controlled substance is used, a second 
degree felony. Mr. Morris was sentenced, on the above-referenced state convictions, on 
July 15, 2014 to 1-15 years in the Utah State Prison with all counts and Case No. 
111903267 to run concurrent with each other. 
On January 15, 2015, counsel for the State, Ryan McBride, verbally informed 
counsel for Morris that the State intended to call Mr. Morris as a witness in the Logue 
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~ trial on January 29, 2015 at 1 :00 p.m. On January 16, 2015, Mr. McBride sent an email 
to counsel for Mr. Logue and Mr. Morris with an attached copy of an undated 
handwritten letter mailed to the Utah County Attorney's Office and signed by Darrell 
Mon-is. See Exhibit A. The letter states the following (with spelling errors, punctuation, 
.;.t,-. ··t0 ..... ,,..1'tt.;.,-1\· 
\.;l,\,;, (...;, VVl l.l.'-'l /• 
Jeffrey R. BuHman / Curtis Larson/ Ryan McBride 
I am writing because I recived a 
Subpoena and Im objecting to this 
I was offered a deal to testify and 
one Not to testify I took the one 
Not to testify. I was told the you 
wanted to leave it open but I said 
no. I will Not testify in this 
case. I think its a dirty trick 
to make that deal then call me 
anyvi1ay. I made it clear in court 
that statement was not from me 
and would not testify or confenn 
any of it. 
Respectfully 
Darrell Morris 
Until January 28, 2015, due to heavy public defender schedules and other 
scheduling conflicts, Mr. Skousen and Mr. Stewart have not been able to coordinate a 
mutual time of a half-day to travel and consult with Mr. Morris to confirm whether 
Morris was, in fact, served a subpoena to testify, if Morris wrote the attached letter 
regarding his objection to being called as a witness, any legal privilege(s) he may assert, 
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and/or other related matters. On January 28, 2015, counsel met with Mr. Morris at the 
Fourth District Court in Provo. 
Between the July 15, 2014 Morris Sentencing by this Court and the filing date of 
this motion to quash, counsel for Morris has not received a copy of any witness subpoena 
-- albeit verbal notice on January 15, 2015 -- from the State that M:01Tis is being called as 
a witness in the Logue trial. As of about 5:00 p.m. on January 28, 2015, the court's X-
change e-filing system does not show that the State has filed a "Return of Service" or 
similar proof of service, in the State of Utah v. Danny Leroy Logue case file with respect 
to Mr. Morris being served with a witness subpoena to testify. 
Between July 15, 2014 and the filing date of this motion to quash, counsel for Mr. 
Morris has not received any formal ,vritten letter or verbal offer of immunity for Mr. 
Mon-is' testimony by the State of Utah or the United States Attorney's Office in the 
current State v. Logue trial. 
ARGUMENT 
Mr. Morris enjoys a right against self-incrimination under both the federal and 
Utah constitutions. See U.S. Const. Fifth Amendment; Utah Const. Article I, § 12. The 
respective governments of the United States and the State of Utah are dual sovereigns, 
and are entitled to bring separate criminal actions, indictments, prosecutions against a 
person for any act that violates both federal and state law. State v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 34, 
36-38 (Utah 1987). Dual prosecutions by the United States government and the State of 
Page 4 of 10 
0020~7 
Utah do not offend double jeopardy principles. See e.g. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 
88, 106 S.Ct. 433, 88 L.Ed.2d 387 (1985). 
In addition to being prohibited by Utah law, possess10n of a dangerous 
weapon/firearin by_. a restricted person/convicted felon is prohibited by federal statute. 
See 18 U.S.C. § 921, el seq. In addition to being prohibited by Utah la\v, possession \Vith 
intent to distribute a controlled substance (i.e., methamphetamine) is prohibited by 
federal statute. See 21 U.S.C. § 841, et seq. Therefore, although Mr. Morris has been 
~ convicted, he could not be prosecuted a second time by the State for the fireann charge or 
the dismissed drug distribution charges. However, there is a substantial risk Morris could 
still be prosecuted federally for the firearm charge/conviction and dismissed drug 
distribution allegations by the U.S. Attorney's Office in federal court. If Mr. Morris was 
charged and convicted in federal court of the above crimes, there is a substantial risk Mr. 
Morris could be subject to a lengthy federal prison sentence. 
-;...,~ \/Jr 
Pursuant to Rule l 4(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, this "court 
may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable." Rule 14(a)(4) 
states that "( w ]ritten return of service of a subpoena shall be made promptly to the com1 
and to the person requesting that the subpoena be served, stating the time and place of 
service and by whom service was made." In this matter, the State has not complied with 
the Rule 14 mandate that proof of service shall be "promptly" filed with the Court. Nor 
~ has the State provided a copy of any witness subpoena to counsel for Morris. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-22b- l ( 1 )(b) directs the prosecutor to show his "intent" to 
"compel" a witness to testify ... under a grant of use immunity" with notice to t~e witness. 
This has not occurred here. This same statute does allow for such use immunity to be 
granted by the prosecutor, on the record, at trial. However, given that this matter has 
been ongoing for over three (3) years now, and that iv1r. iv1orris was sentenced by this 
Court over six (6) months ago, it is fundamentally unfair to Mr. Morris and his counsel to 
be surprised at trial and left in the dark as to how the State intends to specifically proceed 
here. The State received a handwritten letter from Mr. Morris on January 16, 2015 
wherein Mr. Morris objected to the subpoena based upon his understanding that the State 
made him two offers: The first State offer required Morris to testify and the other State 
offer did not require Morris to testify at the Logue trial. Morris states in his letter he 
chose the latter offer because that offer from the State did not require him to testify at the 
Logue trial. The State knew of Morris' intentions and his objection to the subpoena since 
at least January 16, 2015, yet the State and the U.S. Attorney's Office still has not 
disclosed any immunity offer to Morris or his counsel as of January 28. 
The Stale informed the Court that there was no agreement on testimony and the 
State reserved the right to subpoena Mr. Morris to testify at the Logue trial (July 15, 2014 
Transcript pg. 7, Lines 7-15). However, on July 15, 2015, the State's subsequent 
representations to the Court led Morris to reasonably believe he would not be called as a 
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witness at the Logue trial or, if called, only in the State's rebuttal case if Mr. Logue 
testified first: 
Mr. Larson: Our posture is we don't intend to call him [Morris]. A lot of 
it would just depend on how Mr. Logue's trial plays out. 
The Court: Okay. 
Mr. Larson: We don't know if Mr. Logue is going to take the stand or not. 
That would be a big factor in that. 
July 15, 2014 Tr., 7:16-20. 





~ Tr., 14:17-22. 
we--
He's a possibility. 
-- have no agreement that we wouldn't. 
He's a may call. 
May. 
Given the above statements made by the State, it is reasonable to believe Mon-is' 
understanding that he would not be required to testify in the Logue trial except for the 
possibility of being called as a rebuttal witness if Mr. Logue testified first. 
URCrP Rule 14( c) states that Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is 
applicable to criminal cases and "shall govern the content, issuance, and service of 
subpoenas to the extent that those provisions are consistent with the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure." Pursuant to URCP Rule 45(e)(l ), "[t]he party or attorney 
responsible for issuing a subpoena shall take reasonable steps to avoid imposing an undue 
burden ... on the person subject to the subpoena.'' Rule 45(e)(3) states, in part: 
The person subject to the subpoena or a non-party affected by the subpoena 
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may object if the subpoena: 
( e )(3 )(D) requires the person to disclose privileged or other protected 
matter and no exception or waiver applies; 
( e )(3 )(F) subjects the person to an undue burden or cost; (italics added). 
Rule 45( e )( 4 )(A) states: "If the person subject to the subpoena or a non-party 
affected by the subpoena objects, the objection must be made before the date of 
compliance." Morris is filing this motion "before the date of compliance." 
URCP Rule 45(e)(5) states: 
If objection is made, or if a party files a motion for a protective order, the 
party or attorney responsible for issuing the subpoena is not entitled to 
compliance but may move for an order to compel compliance. The motion 
sh al I be served on the other parties and on the person subject to the 
subpoena. An order compelling compliance shall protect the person subject 
to or ajjected by the subpoena from significant expense or harm. The court 
may quash or modify the subpoena. If the party or attorney responsible for 
issuing the subpoena shows a substantial need for the information that 
cannot be met without undue hardship, the court may order compliance 
upon specified conditions. 
(italics added). 
In this matter, the State and the Court is well aware of other persons and witnesses 
,vho have claimed to have received threats of harm and violence for their purported role 
or potential testimony in the Logue trial. Counsel for Morris asserts that Morris is at risk 
of suffering substantial bodily harm or death if he gives testimony in a homicide case due 
to the dangerous circumstances of the prison environment. In addition, Morris asserts his 
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination due to the substantial risk of federal 
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prosecution on his firearm conviction and drug distribution allegations. The witness 
subpoena should be quashed because it would be an undue burden on Morris due to the 
substantial risk of harm in a prison environment where testimony in a homicide case can 
place an inmate in danger of losing his life at the hands of other inmates. 
Hypothetically, even if the State were to fully comply with the court's subpoena 
rules and seek a motion to compel Mr. Morris to comply with the subpoena, the State, the 
Utah Department of Corrections, and the Court have an obligation under URCP Rule 45 
~ to ensure and protect Mr. M01Tis' safety and well-being from the undue burden and risk 
of substantial bodily ham1 or death if he were compelled to comply with the subpoena 
and to testify in this matter. 
WHEREFORE, for the above reasons and good cause showing, Mr. Morris moves 
the Court to quash the witness subpoena for Mr. Morris to testify in this matter. 
RESPECTFULLY Submitted this 28th day of January, 2015. 
NEIL SKOUSEN 
GREGORYV. STEWART 
Attorneys for Darrell Wayne Morris 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personally served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Motion to Quash Witness Subpoena for Darrell Wayne Morris, on this 28th day 
January, 2015, to the following: 
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY 
100 E CENTER ST 
PROVO UT 84606-3106 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT-
PROVO 
125 N 100 W 
PROVO UT 84601-2849 
Sent via: 
_Hand-Delivery 
_Facsimile: (801) 851-8051 
_Mailed (U.S. Mail, postage 
prepaid) 
X Other: Email 
Sent via: 
_Hand-Delivery 
_Facsimile: (80 I) 429-1033 
_Mailed (U.S. Mail, postage 
prepaid) 
_ X _ Other: E-filing system 
,.. __ ·[\ - Q,_ .... -·::,,>_ 1-. ----~----
(}_./'- ~-----. 
_Secretary X Attorney 
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Transcript of Trial--Day Seven 1/30/2015 
PROVO, UTAH; FRIDAY, JANUARY 30, 2015; 9:06 A.M. i 
' THE COURT: Please be seated. We'll go on the record in 




are present . 
presen~: this morning with his counsel. The State's. attorneys 




I would like to begin this morn~ng by hearing _argument, if I 
i 
. ·any~· on· Mr. Morris' ·motion to quash ;hi-s· trial subpqe·na . Counsel 
. would. you state your appearances for the_record? 
MR. SKOUSE~: Neil Skousen, Public D~fender att9rney- for 
Darrell Morris. 
MR. ST.EWART: And Greg Stewait for Mr; Morris. 
j 
i ] 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
I 
I 




MR .. SKOUSEN: I'll be speaking to the motion Your_ Honor. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. SKOUSEN: It will just be a second while I set up 
here. Your Honor, on behalf of Mr. Morris we're asking the 
Court, given the totality of the facts that we raised and the 
case law that we argued, the legal argument, we would ask the 
Court to quash Mr. Morris' subpoena from the State or in the 
alternative we'd ask the Court to consider limiting--the Court 
has the authority to limit the subpoena or to modify it to 
limiting the State's ability to call Mr. Morris in the State's 
rebuttal case only after Mr. Logue testifies and Your Honor when 
I say the totality of the circumstances, I'm assuming the Court 
50 West Broadway, Suite 900, Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
801-983-2180 
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has had an opportunity to read our motion. 
THE COURT: I have. 
MR. SKOUSEN: Thank you. On page 7 of our motion I cite 
to the transcript ~ri-the Morris case, July 15th, and those 
discussions were in chambers on the record obviously and gi v·en 
what the State represented to the parties ·and the Court, and 
given _the is·sue that counsel for Mr. Morris, mys~l-f' and Mr. 
Stewait,· h~ve ncit received a copy of the subpoeri~. · Yes, we did 
receive verbal notice from the State as to that they now 
intended _to call-· Morris and we were told a date of· January-· 29th 
at 1: 00 P.M.· and then th.e next ·day, on. Januarx· 16th, we •did 
receive an· e-mail from Mr. McBride indicating that he _had .or the 
State had received a handwritten letter from Mr. Morris and the 
letter indicates, in my Exhibit A, that Mr. Morris objects to ~ 
! 
the subpoena with his understanding that he believed that he had l 
j a deal not to testify from the State. 
I think that in fairness to the State, Mr. Morris in his 
handwritten letter does acknowledge. He says I was told that 
you wanted to leave it open, but I said no. First of all the 
letter is not dated. I don't think it's disputed that he wrote 
the letter and I think the issue here is it's a matter of 
transparency. 
If the Court is going to look at the totality of the 
circumstances, which I would ask the Court to do, one moment six 
months ago we're hearing from the State we don't intend to call 
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i expressed words from the State from that transcript back on July~-
:~ 
f 15th of last year, s~ems to indicate that the State would call j 
Mr. Morris j,.n the rebuttal case depending oh what Mr .. ~o.gue does· ~ 
l here and a~ain, given that Mr. Stewart and-I have not received a J 
l 
~opy of the·subpoena, Rule 14 does not exp~icitlY say·that we 
ne~d to be ~erved ~ith a·copy of the·subpoeri~,-but:I want to 
poi_n_t O1:1t ·to- the Court a citation, Supreme Co1:1:i:-t of the State of 
Utah .. 
±he· citation--the. case name is St~te ~- G~~zaies, 2005 Ut. 
7~, No:vembe:i: 4, 2.005, and on page 5l of that case; paragraph. 31,. 
this. talk's about what's required with Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure,_.Rule 14, about_notic~ to adverse parties and that 
paragraph reads in evaluating the merits of Mr. Gonzales' 
interpretation that Criminal Rule 14 silence regarding notice is 
intentional, the Court wrote we note. that the text of Rule 
14(b), and Rule 14(b) is referring to victims' records, clearly 
signals that some notice to adverse parties of the issuance of a 
subpoena is contemplated. Now I suppose an issue that we would 
like the Court to rule on is what is some notice? Is it verbal? 
THE COURT: Well is he an adverse party? I don't think he 
is. 
MR. SKOUSEN: Well not specifically as to the Logue 
matter, but it's clear that he's adverse and I think it's fair 
to say that given that he was a co-defendant, he already pled 
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out, he was sentenced, that at that time he was an adverse party ~ 
and the State at that time, on July 15th before he entered a 
plea, indicated they we~en't goipg to call him. 
THE COURT: -Okay. 
MR .. SKOUSEN: So the other issue, and this is ·a ~ticking 
point. that I'.m. sure Mr. Larson will want to address un1es·s it's 
















f i . 





~o~_ris' u~der~tan_ding· or the effect_. of. wha1:: was :17ep~ese·n.ted_ to··· 
him 4"s relevant ·an~ is admiss.ible under the. exc;ept~on under-· ~ule ~ 
508 of the Utah Rulei of Evidence in that he understood that he 
had two offers from the State. One. was to _testify and one was 
not to testify. H~ specifically accepted that offer. 
We expressed that offer back to the State and then there 
















transcript indicates, on July 15th there was no agreement on the ~ 
testimony or no testimony, but Mr. Morris' understanding or the 
effect of the offer that he understood was that he would not 
testify and that's consistent or mostly consistent with what the 
State represented to the Court on July 15th of last year, that 
the State did not intend to call him although they reserved the 
right to. 
THE COURT: Okay, anything else? 
MR. SKOUSEN: Unless the Court has any other questions, 


















I'll submit it. 
THE COURT: I do not. Thank you. From the State? 
MR. MCBRIDE: Yes, Yo~r H9nor. I see maybe two main 
issues here. · One is with regard to the plea _agreement. Counsel 
5 -r~t~ink has been clear that the plea agreem~n~ -did not involve 
6 an·agreement by the State not to call Mr. Morris and Mr. Morris 
·· 7 ;~a~·~ware of that:- He chose to take~~there ~ai an offer th~~ 
8 wa~ if you ~ake this offer, the offer-he didn1 t take, we will 
- 9 · _ · ag~ee -not t_o call·· you .. · He e'lected not: 'to ·take that orfer 
10 . ·because the penalties and the thin·g he woul·d be pleading: guilty 
ii: to:were ~ great severity. So in t~e ~~ite's~eyes ~e took ~he 
. J2 offer kn_owing_.full well that he may b~ called as a witness . 
Now with regard ~o the State's intent at the time and the 
State's intent now, that was not disingeriuous, Your Honor~ 
We're here at trial and we're learning that the defense here is 
the defendant was not even there. We anticipated a defense of 
he was there, but he didn't pull the trigger and Mr. Morris' 
testimony that he was there is more important in our eyes now 
although the State never made an agreement not to call him. 
Fear is the other argument that I think the defendant 






















discussion about that in the past. Well, if not every--the most ) 
24 
25 
important witnesses in this case are fearful. There will be 
testimony on that today I think. That is not grounds to quash a 
subpoena. 
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As to a copy of the subpoena, the return of service--are 
they bringing that? I don't know if that was filed with the 
Court or not, but according to my paralega~ we have the return 
of ~ervLce on MrL Morris~ In addition, he wrdte this letter. 
He obviously got it. 
As ·far- as not.ice goes to his attorneys/ Mr .. Morris· 
notifi~d the Court _of.his ~e~eipt--o~ ~ot t~e to~it, the.State 
and ·p1:'.'qtested.···. He certaiply could have noti_fie~ •:his attorneys 
at that time. 
his· ?-tt<;>r'neys of. that let~~r .'and ~is_ 01:?jec.tion-. at _that· time. 
H-l~ attorneys. hav:e n·ever come· t9 me· and said _can I have a 
copy of that subpoe~a. We have a copy of that su~poeria. That's 
not an issue and we all know what a subpoena says. 
The other grounds of course is the Fifth Arnenciment and 
I've handed that grant of immunity use and derivative use of 
immunity to Mr. Stewart and that mitigates the Fifth Amendment. 
Inasmuch as there is a Fifth Amendment Claim of privilege here, 
again double jeopardy precludes that claim to at least the 
majority of the questions that we'll ask here. 
MR. SKOUSEN: May I respond Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Briefly. Go ahead. 
MR. SKOUSEN: Well Your Honor as stated in my motion, the 
State received Mr. Morris' objection on January 16th, just today 
while I was up here at the podium. My co-counsel handed the 
grant of use immunity. I know the Court has concern--
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THE COURT: That's really not uncommon, I'll tell you 
that, providing the immunity letter: on the day of because we 
don't know what's going to happen and that's been especially 
·true in .this case.· We've been dealing with ·that issue with 
regularity. So--








Cour~ has brought up. ·other issues witp the State regarqing ·-. · _··_. · :j 
transp~rency on Brady issues and I'm just.saying.the State has. 
· ha~ _an ~pportuni_ty _t~ ·let us know· the g:r:-ant ·o·t ·use·. 
i 
' ~ 
Yes, the . • ! 
:r:-uie does allow them to grant the use inunun~ty on the day of· .l 
. j 
t'rial .· ·. . . I 
· .. , So other tha1_1-that, I think that the:i;-e has to be some I 
l 
.reme~y given the totality of the circumstances. No copy of· the ~ 
1, 
subpoena. No proof of service filed yet, even right now_.. So 





if the State is just going to putt that in their back pocket and ) 
I 
l 
not file it with the C6urt. 
So again I'd ask the Court to pay special attention and 
give added weight to what the State told us on the record in 
chambers back on July 15th. It did not intend to call him and 
if it did it would be--the implication clearly was that it would 
be in their rebuttal case and I would ask the Court to limit or 
modify the State subpoena. If the Court's not willing to quash 
the subpoena, _to limit Mr. Morris' testimony to rebuttal only, 
only if Mr. Logue testifies. 
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THE COURT: Very good. Thank you. This matter comes 
before the Court on Mr. Morris' motion to quash his trial 
s~bpo~na. There ar~ really four grounds alleged. The first is 
a contention that h~ has a Fifth Amendment privile<j'e not to 
·testify. : I'm going to deal with that item, that contention._ in 
my more ··complete record i?-S it relates to Mr. Lara. The issues 
are the same there.· 
. . 
. So -se_t:ting aside the F1fth Amendment question·, M9rris · 
· cont~nds th~t· ~~e subp-~ena should ·:be quashed ·be_cause issuance 
a~d servic;:e was procedurally -~l_.awe.d, that issuance ·qf the 
subpoeJ).a -yioiates · t~e pl~~ agre~ment and tJ::lird that he :is· 
fearful of ·r~tribution should he testify. 
With respect.to procedural flaws, there is no requirement 
that Mr. Morris' counsel receive· a copy of the subpoena;· Mr. 
Morris is no longer an adverse party in this case. There's no 





service is not a basis to quash the subpoena. I That can be cured} 
and really Morris suffers no prejudice for the failure to file 
the return. I will direct that the State file the return of 
service with the Court today. 
With respect to the plea agreement, Mr. Morris apparently 
was offered three options. One option was that he would plead 
to certain crimes and the State would bind itself not to call 
him. He rejected that plea offer. He was offered to enter into 
an agreement where he would plead to certain crimes and agree to 
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cooperate. He rejected that offer as well and what he 
ultimately entered into w~s an agreement whereby he would plead 
to certain crimes and the State would haye the option to call 
him, but he would be compelled to particj_pate by the subpoena 
power.s· of· the Court· and ·that's what's ··.happened here.-: 
The record is clear that ~i. Morris remained a may call 
witness and· the State in it~ discreti~i:1 has i_ssue9- ·a: .subpoena to ~ 
him and so.I'm not persuaded that the iubpoena in:any way 
violat~s fhe:plea agreement to which.Mr. Morris qonienied. 
. Finaliy while . Mr. Morr~$ . may have· l~gi tima~~ fears of 
retalia tio·n if he. testifies, that.' fs not a bas.is for·_ a· subpoena. 
being quasJ::ied. 
Turning to the.Fifth Amendment question, I'd like _to, as 
indi~ated yesterday, .make a more co~plete record of what 
occurred with Mr. Lara and then reach the Fifth Amendment 
question on Mr. Morris as well. A.witness' exercise of the 
Fifth Amendment privilege is not evidence to be used in a 
criminal case by any party. Indeed it is unprofessional conduct 
when an attorney calls a witness to testify who he knows will 
claim a valid privilege for the purpose of -impressing upon a 
jury the fact that the privilege is being claimed. 
However an attorney need not accept at face value every 
asserted claim of privilege no matter how frivolous. It is 
sufficient to defeat the suggestion that a witness is being 
called for an improper purpose when an attorney calling the 
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witness has a colorable, albeit ultimately invalid, argument 
that the witness could not validly claim the privilege. These 
principles are set forth in the case o~ State of Utah v. 
.. Augustine,.· 2013. Utah ·Court ·of _Appeals 61. 
In this case Yuri Lara asserted a Fifth Amendment 
~rivilege not to testify. Lara pled guilty to manslaught~r in 













•Purcell.· lie also plec:! g~ilty to four Hrs.t .c:!~gree felony counts · l .. 
of ·di~tribution of a contiolled subst~nce, spett~ica~ly hero~n, I· 
. . ·. ~ 
!. 
l 
· · coc~irie -,· _.meth and XTC :-
The :.State offere·d· Lara .immunity· for ali: cOllat:~ral c;onduct· 1 · 
corc,rrnitted in connection with the offense. La_ra· iridica ted that ~ 
the State's grant of immunity would not change his decision not 
to answer questions. 
Lara made no specific claim before the Court that his 






l is • 
i 
prosecution. Indeed such a possibility, if it exists at all, 
at best uncertain and speculative especially given the 
well-established policy of.the Department of Justice not to 
prosecute a person for allegedly criminal behavior if the 
alleged criminality was an ingredient in a previous state 
prosecution against that person. 
This policy, commonly known as the Petite policy, was 
established in 1959 and continues in force today. The purpose 
of the policy is to vindicate substantial federal interests 
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through appropriate federal prosecutions to protect persons 
charged with criminal conduct from the burdens associated with 
multiple_prose~utions and p~nishments for substantially the same 
acts or transactions and to promote efficient· utilization ·of 
Department. of J:ustice resources and to promote coordinati9n and 
cociperation between federal and stat~ pr9secutor~. 
The policy·precludes the initiation or continuation of a 
. ·. . ' .• .. 
federal prosecution following a -prior_ ·,stat~ ·or federal· 
. prosec~t-ion _bas-~d .··o'n SUb$1:antially the·. s~~e. acts or tr_ans'acti.ons 
uniess three .sub~tantive pre-requisite~ ~ie· ~atisfied. Fiis~ 
the·· matter m{ist·_ involve a substantial ·federal· .. interest. Second 
·:the prior pros_e¢ution must have left tµat •·interest demonst.rably 
unvindicated-and third_applying the same ~est that's applicable 
to all federal prosecutions, the government m~st believe that 
the defendant's conduct constitutes a federal offense and that 
the admissible evidence probably will be sufficient to obtain a 
conviction by the trier of fact. 
Finally before a federal prosecution could be commenced, 
it would require the approval of the authorized Assistant 
Attorney General. 
The Court concluded that Lara had no Fifth Amendment 
privilege to refuse to testify. At the very least the State had 
a colorable argument that no such privilege existed. Therefore 
it was appropriate that Lara be called as a witness in the 
presence of the Jury. 
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This case is very similar to the facts in State v. 
Augustine. There the State called the co-defendant of the 
accused. The co-defendant had pled guilty to ~riminal conduct 
rel~ting to the.underlying 6ffense for which the ·accused was 
charged. . Given the uncertainty of a Fifth Ameriq.men_t privilege, 
the·· cou·rt ·permitted the. co-defendant to be called· in· the : 
pr_esen"c_e · of _:the Jury. Ultimately the Court ·of App.eals- he1d that 
·. ' . . .· 
this. was not ·er'.tor and certainly not reversible error. . . . : 
ConsJst'en·t ~ith this ·.uta);l case law· th~ Court. p-~~mitted 
Lara·~o ~~ called.as a wit~eis, to b~ s~orn and.t~e~ to iec{de 
wh.at he· -:i.ritend~d to Q.O. I ·_think to everyon'e.' s. :3urpiise· i.~ra cLi,.d 
not refuse ·to testify, but.rather began answering some 
questions; admitting to his_ haying pled gu~lty to. man~laughter 
and othei-felony offenses iri.connection with the ca~e. Lara 
then refused to answer any more questions posed to him by the 
State. 
Defense counsel stood and stated that he had only one 
question for Mr. Lara on cross-examination. The question was do 
you know Andy Purcell to which Lara said negative. 
MR. SESSIONS: Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes? 
MR. SESSIONS: I think the question was do you know Danny 
Logue. 
THE COURT: Do you know Danny Logue, thank you. 
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question. 
THE COURT: There was one question on cross. 
MR. LARSON: Yes. Yes .. 
THE COURT: What was it?· 
1/30/2015 
MR. SESSIONS: My questibn ~as-~I d6~'t kriow exactly, ·but 
it was to the effect of prior to criminql charges being bro~ght· 





THE COURT: . Okay, thank·you. 
MR. LARSON: And the· Court is correct Your Honor in that 
. . 
there were questions asked of~him. regarding.his involvement and_ 
being charged,. wha_t h_e pied to.: Then I asked if he knew. Andy 












THE COURT: That's right. 
MR. LARSON: Then I went to the next· question and asked 
wasn't he a friend of yours. At that time he said I'm not going 
to answer any more questions. 
THE COURT: Thank you. I knew there had been a question 
of knowledge of both men. Thank you. In summary then, Lara is 
a critical witness with knowledge of material facts. Not 
calling him exposes the State to the argument that it failed to 
produce critical witnesses or to the inference that Lara's 
testimony would not have supported the State's theory of the 
case. Under these circumstances it is not error for Lara to 
have been called as a witness in the presence of the Jury. 
This case is very similar to a case decided.in New York 
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1 
2 
back in 1958. It's United States v. Gurney. There the Court 
held that it was not improper for the government to call as a 
3 witness an_ individual already convicted of participation in the 
4 ~rime ·for which the accused was standing trial even though that 




testify. Since the testimony which the government sought to 
elicit from the witness concerning a mee_ting with the accused 
and his p6s~~ssion of heroin immediately thereafter was both 
9·. ielevant .and material. 
10 There· the Court concluded that if tne government had not 















counsel for ihe accused that its failure to do so showed that he 
would not have· corroborated the testimony of government agents 
and that really is precisely the issue in this case. 
Turning to Morris' claimed Fifth Amendment privilege, the 
Court concludes as a matter of law that Morris has no Fifth 
Amendment privilege to assert. He certainly has no Fifth 
Amendment privilege because he has pled guilty to criminal 
conduct related to the underlying offense for which Mr. Logue 
has been charged. The State has offered him immunity for any 
collateral conduct surrounding these events. 
With respect to federal prosecution, the Court finds that 
at best that fear is fanciful and merely speculative especially 
given the well-established Petite policy and Morris' plea to 
manslaughter, obstruction of justice and possession of a firearm 
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by a restricted person. This is not a case in which some 
1 
federal interest has been demonstra~ively ~nvindicated. ~ That's 'i 
esp~cially true_ as ~~11 given Morris' police statement in whic~ 
. . . 
he denies p6ssessing having·knowledge that Logue possessed the 









. 'Moreover, given Morris' alr_e?3-dy existir:ig police statement,. f 
,J 
t~~tiinony consi$tent with: t~·~t' s~ate~ent woul_d·. r{ot. ser~e t~ · I 
i~~ri~inate him any further·.:. Mo.rris:= has alr·e~d_ ~ incriminated j 
hims~lf -~o that extent. 
J 
I 
·Mo.rris does .have releyant and ma.terial information related r 
to the ·case and the Sta,te ha:s· a colqrable. argumen·t that he has 
no F_i~th ·Amendment privilege~· · Indeed, 'the Cou~t'. agrees with 
that. Calling Morris is not for the purpose of impressing on 
the Jury. the fact that t~e priviiege is b~ing 6laimed and. 











Jury would draw from Morris' complete absence from the trial. 
Those inferences would be that the prosecution has put on less ~ 
than what they could have or that Morris' testimony would not be l 
supportive of the State's theory. 





be treated in the same way that Lara was treated and this is the ~ ~ 
i 
procedure that we will follow. Morris will be called into Court l 
outside the presence of the Jury. I will have him sworn. I 
will make a record at that time in his presence that he has no 
' •. 
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Fifth Amendment Privilege to refuse to testify. I will explain 
the penalties for not answering questions, specifically that he 
may be charged ~ith obstruction of justice, p~rjury or held in 












' ' I· will then· order him to answer questions·•· ' I ·will ·explain . I '. 
I . ' . the. process to. him; that the Jury ~ill be inv_i !:~d back in, that 
·th~ prosecutor. will be given an oppor:t_un_ity ~o pose ques~_~oris to 
. ' 
him ·after which defense counsel will be- given· t_ha t opportunj, ty 
and ··he may the_n decide what he wants to do. ·. ·. 






he refuses _to answer questions,. then the .Jury will. be. dismissed. I 
Outside the presen_ce of the Jury it will_ be my i!'lte·nt at tha~ I 
time to· hold him in direct contempt of Court, ~.rnpose sanctions 
an·d have him . step down. 








1 MR. MCBRIDE: Your Honor I'm hand_ing the return.of service ~ 
~ ~ ; for Darrell Morris [inaudible] 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
[Inaudible discussions.] 
BAILIFF: All rise for the Jury. 
[The Jury enters the Courtroom.] 
THE COURT: Thank you very much. Please be seated. 
Ladies and gentlemen thank you for your patience. We will go 
back on the record in the matter of State of Utah v. Logue. 
Logue is present with his counsel. The State's attorneys are 
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MR. LARSON: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let's have Mr. Morris in if we could. 
Where is Mr. Stewart? 
MR .. SKOUSEN: I'll go get him. 
'THE.tOURT:·. L~t-me just -ask you, did_you rleed-a few 
minutes b~fore M~. Morris b~fore we begin~ 
MR. ·sKOUSEN: ·We've ~lr·eady spoke7:1 to him~ 
THE:_ COURT: ·/Okay, very _good. 
MR. SKOUSEN:· I think w.e 're ready to go. I' 11. go get Mr. 
.Stewart. 
BAIL!FF:. ··[inaudible] 
THE COURT: Okay, very ~ood. 
[Inaudible.discussions.] 
BAILIFF: Are you ready-for him? 
THE COURT: I am. 
BAILIFF: Bring him out. 
THE COURT: Mr. Morris, if you'll come forward and be 
seated here on the witness stand. The record should reflect 
that we are on the record in the matter of State of Utah v. 
Logue. Mr. Logue is present. His attorneys are present. The 
State's attorneys are present. The Jury is not here and Mr. 
Darrell Wayne Morris is on the witness stand. Is that your full 
name, Sir? 
MR. MORRIS: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Morris you are currently under 
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a subpoena, a trial subpoena to testify in this case. Through 
your attorneys--let me jus·t ask initi~llyr have you had an 
opportu_ni ty to speak w~ th your _at tor~eys Mr. Stew?J.rt and Mr. --
.MR. SKOUSEN: Skousen\ 
THE COURT: ~-Skousen; I'm so· sqrry.· Have you had an 
9ppo~tunity to speak with them? 
MR. ~ORRIS: . Yep. 
THE COURT: Do you. need ~ny more·.:· time with them this 
morni_ng? · • 
MR." MORRIS: No. 
THE COURT: You're ~nde~ i triai·subpo~ga to.give 
testim<;>ny. Through your attor·neys, · they have as·s_erted that you 
have· ~ Fifth Amendment privilege not_ to testify. 
legal arguments about that and I've ruled that as ·a matter of 
law you have on Fifth Amendment privilege to refuse to testify 
in the case. 
A trial subpoena is a Court order to testify. If you 
willfully refuse to testify, then you can be held in contempt of 
Court. The potential penalties for being held in contempt are 
that you can serve up to 30 days in the County Jail. 
fined up to a thousand dollars. 
You can be 
More significantly, if you refuse to testify you can be 
charged with obstruction of justice which is a second degree 
felony, or perjury which is also a second degree felony. Those 
offenses are punishable by terms of not less than one or more 
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than 15 years in the Utah State Prison and a ten thousand dollar 
fine. If you were to commit multiple felonies in that regard, 
you c~n serve tho~~ prison sentenc~s conse~uti ve:ly, where yc;n.~· 
-~ould s~tve one 1~15 term and then begin serving ~~e.next ~erm. 
At this juncture is it you~ inteht to testify in the case 
_·1:1nderst_andin_g what. I''ve explained to you? 
MR. MORRIS:. -t;Jo .. 
THE COURT: O~ay. Let me expl_ain what--let ine ask you 
this; ·Now that ~' ve explained_ that to you,. do .you want to ·_speak. 
to you~·aftorneys.a~~in 6r are you okay? 
MR. MORR~S: I'~ all right. 
THE COURT: ·<;)k?Y· Let me explain now·we~ll.proceed then~ 
I'm gotng to have_ the· Jury btought back in. They'll be sea~ed 
here: I· will have ·y"ou sworn as a witness. Raise. your right 
hand as best you can, take an oath. Mr. McBride will be the 
prosecutor. He will stand up. He will ask you a question a~d 
then you can decide what you want to do. The defense attorneys 
may ask a question. You decide what you want to do. If you 
refuse to answer, then we'll proceed from that point. If you 
decide you want to answer you may do so. 
Lastly I want to give you plenty of opportunity to 
consider what you're going to do because your decision today has 
consequences. Do you need some time to think about it or are 
you ready to go? 
MR. MORRIS: I'm ready. 
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THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. MCBRIDE: Your Hano~ can we just place on the record 
that the State has provided _immunity_ to Mr. Morris·. .I: served 
that on his attorney earlier today. 
· THE COURT: I appreciate that. Have:you had an 
. . 
9pportunity" to speak with your attor~eys apout ~ proposed 
i~un_i ty agre·eme_nt? 
MR. MORRIS: Yep. 
THE ·coURT: Okay~· Have you done that Mr. Stewart. 
MR. STEWART: We have Judge ar:id we received a copy' of the 
.'{mmuni ty. in w·ri ting_. 
THE COURT: Very good.· Let me just explain. That i I 
immunity, ~ou've already entered guilty ~leas· in connection with·!. 
the underlyirig offense.. That immunity agreement would liar the J.. 
State from using any evidence that you might give on the stand 
today in a future prosecution. It would relate to the conduct 
that surrounds this event to the extent that you were asked to 
admit to criminal conduct. 
Understanding that the State couldn't use anything that 
you said today against you in a future prosecution, does that 
change your mind about what you want to do? 
MR. MORRIS: No. 
THE COURT: Okay and do you need--again do you need any 
more time at this point? 
MR. MORRIS: No. 
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THE COURT: Okay. Let's have the Jury back. 
unrestrained? Good, thank you. 
BAILIFF: All rise for the J~ry. 
·[The Ju~y enters.the Courtroom.] 
. THE ·COP.RT: · Thank you ladies and gentiemen. 
1 











seat~d. We ~ill go back on the record in the ~tter ~f State of_! 
Utah v. ·Dann:r _Logue. Mr.' Logue is pr~sent wi t-ri •his cou!l~el. · J · · 




Sir, would y~u state yo~_r full name for the record? 
MR. MORRIS: 
. . 
Darrell Wayne Morris .. ! 
·THE .COURT:. Th_ank yo·u. Would you ratse your right hand as 1 
i . 
best·you rian.and be sworn? 






.Utah~ b~i~g first duly sworn, was examined and·test{fied on his l 
oath as follows. 
T.HE COURT: Go ahead Mr .. McBride. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MCBRIDE: 
Q. Mr. Morris are you aware that a man by the name of 
Andy Purcell was shot and killed on May 16, 2011. 
A. I refuse to answer that question. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Does the defense have any 
questions for Mr. Morris? 
MR. SESSIONS: I do. He may refuse to answer as well. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
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BY MR. SESSIONS: 
Q. Mr. Morris isn't it true that on th~ early morning 
hpurs of May 16, 2011,. you_trav~led from Or~~ to Provo, dropped 
_Danny off near a Maverick·station~~nd other.hotels by the Provo 
Towne Center and that ·you were· aw:a.y from him for a period of 
time? 
A .. I refuse to ·answer ·the q;ues~ion. 
THE COURT: Tha·nk yo:u. 
· -MR. SESSIONS: No fur.theii• questions .. 
. . THE COURT: Thank y9_u_. 
MR. MCBRIDE:· I wo_uld just··make cl~_ar that I can ask many_ 
qu~s_tions, but is that his answer. to ·all que~t~ons? 
THE COURT: Thank you .. Mr .. Morris is it your intent to 
refuse to answer all.questions posed to you during the course of 
this proceeding? 
MR .. MORRIS: Yes, it is. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Ladies and gentlemen, we'll recess 
for just a few minutes. Please keep in mind my prior admonition 
to you. Don't discuss the case amongst yourselves or with 
anyone else. Do no research on your own. Form or express no 
opinions until you've heard all the evidence and you're in the 
course of deliberations, which you are not at this time. 
Court's in recess. 
BAILIFF: All rise. 
[The Jury leaves the Courtroom.] 
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THE COURT: Thank you. Please be seated. We are now 
outside the presence of the Jury. Bae~ on. the record in the 
m~tter of Stat~ of Utah v: Logue. His_coun~el are pres~~t. The 
pro~ecutors _are present. Mr. Morris is· on the stand. 
Mr. Morris· based on your ref°'usal. to tes:tify ,· I do. find 
that y~~ are.in •direct contempt .of Court. ± will ~rde1; that you 
serve 30 day~ in t~e -County Jail. · Ord~r 'that that run 
c·or:isecutive to the pris.on terms .you ar:~ currently serving .and 
. . ·. 
that· you pay··a $1-,.000.o·o f_ine. Ultimately:the.State's·· 
pr6;ecutor~ will' have to.s6reen .the case ·and~decide w~e~het. or 
noi: · an . obs true ti oi::t of j us ti ce cha.rg·e_, . oile or :ffiore, ;., i.11 bei f i 1 ed I 
against you an~-~hat will be a d~ciston foi another day~-
You mar step down and go with the corre~tions officer~ 
MR. STEWART: Your Honor I.just want to.make clear,· ctid 
the Court order him to testify? 
THE COURT: I did. 
MR. STEWART: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Mr. Morris before you go, could you just go to 
the podium and let me make that record just in case it's not 
clear. I explained to you earlier that a trial subpoena is a 
Court order to testify and I don't need to do this again, but 
I'll tell you I'm going to order that you testify in this case. 
Is it your intent to comply with that order or not? 
MR. MORRIS: No. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Sir. If you will go with 












































Transcript of Trial--Day Seven 1/30/2015 
the corrections officer. Let's take about ten minutes. Court's 
in recess. 
BAILIFF: All rise. 
[RECESS.] 
THE- COURT: Thank you. Please .. b:e. seated. we· are back in 
the m~tt~r of State of Utah v. ·Logue~ ,.He is present with his 
. . . 
· counseli. T~e -State's attorneys·ar~ present. We aie dut~ide the 
presence.of the Jury. 
· MR. ·LARSON: Your Honor our ne'xt witness is _Brittany 
Bishop.· . The Court appointed the P·ublic Defender's . Off ice to 
. conyer se with her. Mr. Thomp_son is here. . He~ :S had a lengthy 
·discussion with her. We'd just ask that he indicate what has 
transpired in that.· 
TH°E. COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. THOMPSON: Yes, Your Honor. I received a copy of a 
document called gran~ of use immunity. pursuant to Utah Code 
77-22B-l. The State has offered Ms. Bishop immunity in the 
event that she decides to invoke her Fifth Amendment right. As 
I've discussed this section with her and this offer, my 
impression is that she is going to invoke the Fifth Amendment 
right and that she would be, after that, ordered by this Court 
to comply given the fact that the State has offered her 
immunity. So we expect that's what will happen. 
Because use immunity doesn't reach any and all potential 
uses of her statements today, I have informed her that--well 
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